A Performance Evaluation of Norwegian Mutual Funds: Luck versus Skill by Jørgensen, André & Driveklepp, Jonas
ANDRÉ JØRGENSEN 
JONAS DRIVEKLEPP 
A Performance Evaluation of 
Norwegian Mutual Funds:  
Luck versus Skill	
SUPERVISOR 
Valeriy Ivanovich Zakamulin 
University of Agder, 2021 
School of Business and Law 
Department of Economics and Finance 
A Performance Evaluation of Norwegian Mutual
Funds: Luck versus Skill




In this master’s thesis, we examine the performance of Norwegian mutual fund man-
agers. Through a dataset of 107 Norwegian mutual funds’ monthly returns from 1987-2019,
we estimate fund managers’ abnormal performance using Carhart (1997) four-factor model.
First, we find that the managers cannot generate significant abnormal returns on an aggre-
gate level. Further, we test the null hypothesis of zero performance in bootstrap approaches
similar to Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and White (2006) and Fama & French (2010)
to test whether the performance is is a result of luck or skills. We find no evidence of skill
among the outperforming funds. However, we find evidence towards a lack of skill among
the underperforming funds. Ultimately, we implement a new approach by Harvey & Liu
(2020) for statistical testing under a new null hypothesis: A specific fraction of managers
outperform or underperform the benchmark. The approach allows us to estimate the Type II
error rate and the Test power. We find that the Test power is well below the recommended
level. Hence, there might be some skillful managers in the Norwegian mutual fund market,
though our test lacks the power to detect these. However, we find clear evidence towards the
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1 Introduction
In this thesis, we evaluate the performance of actively managed Norwegian mutual funds. In-
vestors may choose between actively managed funds that seek to generate a return in excess of
a market benchmark or low-cost passively managed funds that replicate the benchmark index to
match its result. If actively managed funds aspire to outperform their benchmark, the manager
must display stock-picking skills. Such skills come at a price, and thus mutual fund managers
require a premium for their services. These fees are deducted before evaluating the net asset
value (NAV) of the fund, and as a consequence, the cost of active management directly affects
the fund’s net asset value. Furthermore, mutual fund managers must evaluate the market to iden-
tify and exploit incorrectly priced securities to generate abnormal returns. Hence, stock-picking
skills are needed to create a portfolio of securities capable of beating the market.
A manager’s performance is increasingly affected by external factors in the financial world
due to increasing financial investment opportunities. These factors may affect the fund through
market development and market behavior. These factors are further implemented through bench-
mark factor models to assess their impact on a fund’s return. The idea is that, while the manager
chooses the stocks, some companies display a return affected by market movement and are thus
pre-disposed for growth. These attributes are considered excess of the manager’s fundamental
stock-picking skills and will serve as coefficients in the regression analysis of excess return. Ex-
isting literature aims to isolate the manager’s performance through these factors and retain the
performance in a single parameter, the alpha (α).
There are several approaches to evaluate the performance of mutual funds in previous liter-
ature. First, Jensen (1968) introduced Jensen‘s alpha, α, to measure fund managers’ abnormal
performance by excluding market factors. Further, Fama & French (1993) and Carhart (1997)
added additional factors to increase the power in estimating the actual performance of funds.
Next, Kosowski et al. (2006) introduced a bootstrap approach to separate skill from luck in the
generated alphas. Their method tests the performance of managers individually under the null
hypothesis of zero performance for all managers. Their results on the US fund market found that
a minority of managers exhibit skill and generate returns to more than cover their costs.
Fama & French (2010) contributed to the test by Kosowski et al. (2006) to account for the
potential correlation between fund returns and the possibility of survivorship bias in the sample.
They use a similar dataset as Kosowski et al. (2006). However, their results suggest no skill
among US mutual fund managers. Harvey and Liu (2020) further suggest that the absence of the
rejection of the null hypothesis of zero performance might result from low Test power rather than
a lack of skill. They introduce and test for the null hypothesis; a fraction of managers outperform
or underperform. Which further allows for the estimation of the Type II error and the Test power.
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Harvey & Liu (2020) identify modest evidence of skill among the US mutual fund managers
with the same dataset.
Performance evaluation of the Norwegian mutual fund market frequently implements the
approaches designed by Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama & French (2010). For example,
Sørensen (2011) implemented the approach of Kosowski et al. (2006) with modifications from
the method of Fama & French (2010) onto a sample free of survivorship bias. He identified
weak tendencies towards skill among the best performers. In contrast, he found clear signs
of a lack of skill among managers. Further, the master’s thesis of Braathe & Bjerke (2019)
implemented Kosowski et al. (2006) onto a more recent dataset of funds’ historical return. They
identified no evidence of skill among the best-performing funds and found a clear indication of
a lack of skill among the worst-performing funds. Previous studies have, to our knowledge, not
yet implemented the recently developed approach of Harvey & Liu (2020) onto the Norwegian
market.
Our research question is two-folded. i) Are Norwegian mutual fund managers able to beat
their benchmark? Furthermore, ii) is their performance a result of luck or skill? These research
questions are previously well-conducted in the performance evaluation of the Norwegian mutual
fund market. However, there seems to be a lack of estimation of Type II error rate and Test power
in the existing literature. Consequently, this master’s thesis aims to supplement said literature by
implementing the methods of Kosowski et al. (2006), Fama & French (2010) and Harvey & Liu
(2020) onto the Norwegian mutual fund market.
We evaluate 107 Norwegian mutual funds’ monthly returns in the time period 1987 to 2019.
We require a minimum of 12 months of observations to consider possible survivorship bias in the
data sample. First, we test whether fund managers can generate significant abnormal returns on
the aggregate level through three different factor models. We select Carhart’s (1997) four-factor
model to estimate the funds’ alpha, measuring abnormal performance. Second, we test whether
the performance results from luck or skill through the bootstrap procedure of Kosowski et al.
(2006) and test the null hypothesis of zero performance individually. Third, we use a similar
bootstrap approach to Fama & French (2010) to jointly test the best and worst funds by the null
hypothesis of zero performance, which allows us to evaluate if any of the best funds and their
managers exhibit skill. Through this procedure, we account for possible correlation in the α that
the factor model fails to capture. Ultimately, to present novelty to the subject, we implement the
double bootstrap method of Harvey & Liu (2020). Their procedure allows us to estimate the Type
II error rate and the Test power through the null hypothesis: a fraction of managers outperform
or underperform. We follow their procedure to estimate cutoff values by controlling for a certain
level of Type I error to characterize the Type II error rate.
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Harvey & Liu (2020) and their recently developed performance evaluation method is the
latest in a long line of methodologies with the same intent: to create a robust, definite and com-
prehensive statistical analysis towards mutual fund managers’ actual performance and skill. The
novelty of the methodology of Harvey & Liu (2020) lies in their assumptions on hypotheses.
Instead of using a single hypothesis, they introduce the possibility of multiple alternative hy-
potheses in each test. Kosowski et al. (2006) only focus on Type I error rate, and their null
hypothesis is that all funds have α = 0. Harvey & Liu (2020) focus on both Type I and Type II
error rates, and their null hypothesis is that a fraction of funds have α > 0. By changing the null
hypothesis, it is possible to make several tests with different assumptions upon the dataset. By
executing the previously mentioned methods, we can test whether there are any outperforming
or underperforming Norwegian mutual fund managers as a result of stock-picking skills or lack
thereof.
Our findings suggest that we cannot identify any statistical significance in the positive alpha
(0.035) on the aggregate level. When we estimate the standard parametric alpha for each fund,
some Norwegian fund managers generate positive alphas, which implies that they beat their
benchmark. However, when we test the null hypothesis of zero performance, we can distinguish
skill from luck in the generated alphas. In the tests similar to Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama
& French (2010), we fail to reject the null hypothesis of zero performance for the funds that
generate a positive alpha; we fail to identify skill. However, we reject the same null hypothesis
for the funds that generate a negative alpha. The rejection implies that the worst performances
are a result of the absence of skill.
By testing the null hypothesss: a fraction of managers outperform, in the double bootstrap
approach by Harvey & Liu (2020), we reject the null hypothesis. We find no statistically sig-
nificant evidence of skillful managers among the best performers. However, our estimated Test
power of around 50% indicates that there might be skillful managers, but our test lacks the power
to detect these. For the worst-performing funds, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of under-
performing funds. Thus, we find statistically significant evidence that skill is absent among the
worst-performing Norwegian mutual fund managers.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 describes relevant literature, providing
a brief literature review of previous papers on the subject. Section 3 contains the methodology
of our thesis, describing the models and methods in detail. Section 4 presents our analyses’
data, with a thorough presentation of our data sample, factors, and the Norwegian mutual fund
market as a whole. Section 5 shows the empirical results of our findings and evaluations of the
performance of mutual fund managers through the different statistical procedures and methods.
Finally, section 6 contains remarks and conclusions.
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2 Literature review
The literature on fund performance evaluation is highly influenced by the Capital Asset Pricing
Model, CAPM. Through an expansion of the CAPM derived from the work of Sharpe (1964)
and Lintner (1965), Jensen (1968) introduced Jensen’s alpha, α. This approach aims to measure
fund managers’ performance by comparing actual returns and expected returns, conditional on
the risk-free rate, systematical risk, and the actual return on the market portfolio in a specific
time period. This model is commonly referred to as the single-factor model.
Using the single-factor model and the alpha as a measure of fund performance compared
to the benchmark, Jensen (1968) analyzed US funds’ historical return from 1945-1964. The
assumption of Jensen (1968) was that investors would accept higher risk only if they are com-
pensated with a higher expected return in the future. Therefore, the analysis incorporated the
difference in returns of funds, regarding the Market factor and alpha of the fund, compared to
a mean-variance efficient of an uninformed investor. The latter being the study’s benchmark
(Jensen, 1968). By using the market proxy of a passively managed fund, the analysis found that
US funds, on average, were not able to beat their respective benchmarks sufficiently, considering
the incurred management fees. Thus, the conclusion was that Jensen (1968) did not locate any
significant positive alphas in his study. Hence, no outperforming funds were discovered using
the single-factor model through multiple conventional testing.
Fama & French (1993) created the three-factor model to summarize and incorporate the
cross-section of market stock returns in the mid-1990s. They identified that the cross-section
average returns on US stocks displayed little relation to the market beta (β) of the regression
in the CAPM model by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). Therefore, two additional factors,
the Small-Minus-Big (SMB) and the High-Minus-Low (HML), were implemented to increase
power in detecting managers’ performance in mutual funds. Carhart (1997) argued, from the
work of Grinblatt & Titman (1992) and Jegadeesh & Titman (1993), that the Momentum factor
of stocks must be considered for the evaluation of mutual fund managers’ performance, and thus
introduced the four-factor model for asset pricing.
Gruber (1996) was the first to implement the multi-factor model in a study from 1985 to
1994. He argued that by looking at the average expense ratio, mutual fund managers could
generate abnormal returns gross of expenses. The results suggested that mutual fund managers
have superior stock-picking skills. However, the cost of these skills was too high. The question of
whether mutual fund managers had sufficient stock-picking skills to cover their costs was further
studied by Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997). They discovered that the mutual
fund managers exhibit a certain level of stock-picking skill, identifying similar results to Gruber
(1996), where managerial fees neutralized performance. Until this point, several studies differ in
4
their results on whether there exist managers with stock-picking skills on an aggregate level. The
results presented on the average level for mutual fund managers indicated that managers did not
exhibit stock-picking skills to justify their management cost. However, the results do not imply
that every mutual fund manager fails to beat their benchmark.
Kosowski et al. (2006) introduced a new approach to assess whether the abnormal return
of mutual fund managers resulted from stock-picking skills or luck. Through their bootstrap
method, they use an individual fund’s bootstrapped p-value as a measurement to detect whether
the identified abnormal return, positive or negative, was a product of skillful stock-picking or a
result derived from lucky investments. Their results on the US fund market found that a minority
of managers do, in fact, exhibit skill and produce returns to more than cover their cost, and
keeping their positive α persisting over time. The methodology of Kosowski et al. (2006) will be
discussed in detail later in the thesis. Fama & French (2010) further contributed to this bootstrap
procedure with an alternative approach. They use a similar sample to Kosowski et al. (2006) and
present the same results on the worst funds; they display a lack of stock-picking skill rather than
an unlucky performance. However, they could not detect any skill among managers in contrast
to Kosowski et al. (2006). Fama & French (2010) contributed to the joint test by Kosowski et
al. (2006) to account for the correlation in the alpha estimates that the benchmark factor model
did not capture. In addition, they suggested that the minimum required observations should be 8
months instead of Kosowski et al.’s (2006) 18 months to account for potential survivorship bias.
Harvey & Liu (2020) present a new approach to determine statistical significance in mul-
tiple testing of performance evaluation. By introducing the cutoff t-statistic as a measure of
significance, Harvey & Liu (2020) control for a certain level of False Discovery Rate (FDR) to
incorporate the possibility of luck in the sample and thus increase the threshold for significance.
Their new procedure argues that if we cannot reject the null hypothesis, it may not necessarily
be due to a lack of skill by managers. Instead, it may be a result of low power in the analysis per-
formed. Harvey & Liu (2020) further discuss the method of cutoff t-statistics as a measurement
for significance and expand their study by assessing the various error rates in multiple testing in
performance evaluation. Creating a dynamic vector of funds being tested, p0, introduced multi-
ple testing with multiple hypotheses. They test for different numbers of alleged outperforming
funds by using their method of cutoff t-statistic and introduce the assessment of Type I and Type
II error rates in the sample. Harvey & Liu (2020) argue that the possibility of these error rates in
performance evaluation may have a considerable economic impact on the investor. They intro-
duce a tool, Oratio, to represent the trade-off between the error rates and to be used by investors
to weigh the cost of these possible errors.
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In the performance evaluation of the Norwegian Mutual Funds market, Sørensen (2011) em-
ployed the bootstrap method from Kosowski et al. (2006) with some modifications from Fama
& French (2010). In addition, he implemented the factor models of Fama & French (1993)
and Carhart (1997) onto the Norwegian mutual fund market. Using a sample free of survivor-
ship bias, Sørensen analyzed the distinction between luck and skill in the Norwegian market.
The results displayed weak tendencies towards skill in the cross-sectional distribution of alphas.
However, he found clear signs of managers showing a lack of skill. Due to the small size of the
Norwegian Fund Market compared to the US market, Sørensen (2011) focused on survivorship
bias and implemented funds with a short lifetime. He argued that the overall Norwegian funds
market would be biased if long life expectancy were put forth as an assumption for the sample
with its low number of contestants. He further argues that a fund’s short life span is explained
by either administrative faults, unskilled management or insufficient management costs to cover
their overall expenses. The findings also disclosed that there was little to no persistence regarding
winners or losers in the market.
Previous research on Norwegian mutual fund performance portrays a certain amount of
scarcity in the literature. However, over the recent years, there have been several master’s theses
on the subject, applying various procedures towards evaluating the performance of Norwegian
mutual funds. Utseth & Sandvik (2015) performed an analysis of mutual fund returns, per-
sistence and business cycle asymmetries in the Norwegian fund market by locating abnormal
performance and whether such performance is considered skill or luck. The sample consists of
98 funds, with the lowest number of observations per fund being 17. Utseth & Sandvik (2015)
implemented the bootstrap procedure of Kosowski et al. (2006). However, in their use of the
factor model, they perform a consideration of both a conditional and unconditional use of the
Carhart (1997) four-factor model but ultimately perform their analysis using the unconditional
method. The unconditional four-factor model assumes constant exposure to the risk factors over
time. Their results indicate no superior stock-picking skill in the Norwegian mutual fund mar-
ket. However, they locate evidence towards, but ultimately reject, their null hypothesis of funds
underperforming due to lack of skill. Further, they find evidence of persistence both in out- and
underperforming funds up to a time window of 6 months. Ultimately, they identify evidence
that fund managers’ performance indicates some superiority to passive management in times of
recession (Utseth & Sandvik, 2015).
Bråthe & Bjerke (2019) perform a similar study to Utseth & Sandvik (2015) on the perfor-
mance in the Norwegian mutual fund market. The sample consists of funds’ historical returns
from 1987-2019. They keep the restrictions on the number of observations, 12 being the least
number of observations of any fund in the sample. Bråthe & Bjerke (2019) also use the uncon-
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ditional Carhart (1997) four-factor model in their analyses and the method of Kosowski et al.
(2006) as their bootstrap approach. However, differing from the findings of Utseth & Sandvik
(2015), they identify a clear indication of the lack of skill in active management of mutual funds.
Moreover, their results on outperformance in funds coincide, providing evidence that no funds
outperform due to skill, net of management fees.
3 Methodology
This section will describe the methodology of the thesis and the methods used in our analyses on
the performance of Norwegian Mutual Funds. First, we will define the various benchmark mod-
els. Second, we will describe the bootstrap methods introduced by Kosowski et al. (2006), Fama
& French (2010) and Harvey & Liu (2020) in detail, which we later perform in the Empirical
Results.
3.1 Factor models for Performance of Norwegian Mutual Funds
In previous literature on the subject, there are several different approaches to the factor models
of mutual fund performance. Jensen(1968) based his risk-adjusted measure, known as Jensen’s
Alpha, upon the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and
Mossin (1966). The single-factor model contains only one factor, MKT, and is given by
Ri,t = αi + βiMKTt + εi,t, (1)
where Ri,t represent the return, αi represent the funds return not explained by the Market factor,
MKT represent the market risk premium and εi,t is the error term for a given fund, i at a given
time, t. The βi represents the coefficient value estimated through the OLS regression in the
benchmark factor model. The Market factor is defined as the Market Risk Premium or the excess
market return. In essence, MKT is computed as the benchmark index, here the OSEAX index,
minus the risk-free rate. The choice of the benchmark index and the computation of the risk-free
rate will be discussed in detail in Section 4 - Data.
Fama & French (1993) is arguably the most influential paper on performance evaluation,
according to Sørensen (2011). Fama & French (1993) construct three different factors used
in performance evaluation. First, they re-use the well-known factor of Market Risk Premium,
the Market Factor (MKT), introduced by Jensen (1968). Second, they consider that small-
capitalization stocks outperform large-capitalization stocks and thus construct the factor Small-
Minus-Big (SMB). Third, they considered that stocks with a high book-to-market ratio often
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performed better than their counterpart and implemented the factor of High Minus Low (HML).
The Fama & French three-factor model is given by
Ri,t = αi + βiMKTt + β2iSMBt + β3iHMLt + εi,t, (2)
where αi is the isolated performance parameter for a given fund, i, MKT is the Market factor,
SMB is the Small-Minus-Big, HML is the High-Minus-Low and εi,t is the error term for a given
fund, i at a given time, t. The βi represent the coefficient value to be estimated through the OLS
regression in the benchmark factor model.
In addition to the factors used in Fama & French’s three-factor model, Carhart (1997) intro-
duced the four-factor model. The new factor was estimated based on the findings of Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993). By adding the Momentum factor (PR1YR), Carhart created the four-factor
model containing the factors as parameters for the intercept. The Momentum factor focuses on
the one-year performance anomaly by assuming stocks that previously have increased will con-
tinue to grow, and vice versa with decreasing stocks. Descriptive statistics for these factors are
described and presented in detail under Section 4.4 Risk Factors. Carhart’s four-factor model is
given by
Ri,t = αi + β1iMKTt + β2iSMBt + β3iHMLt + β4iPR1Y Rt ++εi,t, (3)
where the parameters remain as defined in Fama & French (1993) three-factor model, and
PR1YR is the Momentum factor at time t.
All featured factor models contain the αi as the pricing error. Thus, by definition, the αi
serves as the parameter which the factors fail to explain in computing the funds’ excess return.
In other words, after every factor in each model is taken into account, the remaining explanatory
effect towards a funds return will be the αi. Therefore, this term is the definition of excess
return in our thesis, and we will focus on the alpha of each fund to assess its performance in the
Norwegian Mutual Fund market.
Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model will be the basis for our analyses, as we will present later
in the thesis. The different factor models featured in this section will be discussed and considered
in detail during Section 4 - Data. Then, we will discuss the different methods by their descriptive
capabilities and statistical significance to further assess the use and choice of a benchmark proxy.
3.2 Bootstrap
This subsection presents the three bootstrap procedures performed in this thesis. The bootstrap
methodology is essential to distinguish luck from skill in manager performance. First, we will
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describe the bootstrap method of Kosowski et al. (2006) to analyze statistical significance for
all the individual mutual funds’ performance. Second, we use Fama & French (2010) method to
find statistical significance in a joint test for the best and worst-performing funds. Eventually, we
will implement the method of Harvey & Liu (2020), where we find the cutoff t-statistics under
the assumption that a fraction of managers have skills. This approach also allows us to estimate
the Type II error and Test power.
Kosowski et al. (2006) present, among several arguments, the benefits of using the bootstrap
approach when the sample size is small when there is a limited amount of observations. Our
dataset of Norwegian mutual funds is quite limited, as presented in Appendix D. Both Kosowski
et al. (2006), Fama & French (2010) and Harvey and Liu (2020) perform their analyses onto
the US mutual fund market with a more comprehensive sample in terms of available data. In
addition, some Norwegian mutual funds contain few observations due to a short life span. The
limitations on data further display the necessity of a bootstrap procedure to conduct our hypothe-
ses tests.
By repeating the same test of alphas several times, we retrieve the funds’ alpha t-statistics.
Some of the individual mutual funds display alpha values with nonnormally distributed returns.
According to Kosowski et al. (2006), this nonnormality could arise for several reasons.
• Mutual fund managers tend to hold heavy positions in relatively few stocks or indus-
tries that contradict the central limit theorem where an equal-weighted portfolio of non-
normally distributed stocks will approach normality.
• Co-skewness between the market benchmark and the individual stock returns may occur.
If the market benchmark returns are non-normal, then as a consequence, the individual
stock returns may also be non-normal.
• Mutual fund managers tend to have dynamic strategies, changing their level of risk, in re-
sponse to performance compared to similar portfolios or overall market portfolio changes.
Each of the irregularities presented could lead to non-normally distributed alphas, such that
normality might be a poor approximation. Further, the cross-section has several conditions too.
The correlation needs to be equal to zero in the residuals. The managers need similar risk lev-
els to ensure no parameter estimator errors that undertake standard critical values of the normal
distribution remain suitable for the cross-section. Considering all conditions as previously men-
tioned, the bootstrap procedure is the most suitable method to apply, and thus ensure that we do
not have to rely on these parametric assumptions. The intention is that we instead estimate the
statistical distribution of interest to infer in the multiple tests correctly.
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In the first test by Kosowski et al. (2006), we evaluate both the estimated alpha and the alpha
t-statistic. For the tests by Fama and Fench (2010) and Harvey & Liu (2020), we only consider
the alpha t-statistic. According to Busse, Goyal & Wahal (2010), Fama & French (2010) and
Kosowski et al. (2006), there are statistical reasons to evaluate the alpha t-statistic rather than
the alpha estimates. These reasons are due to alpha estimation’s precision, where the alpha will
vary across the funds for two reasons—the length of mutual funds’ return history and the degree
of diversification. The alpha t-statistic (αt) describes the statistical significance of the estimated
alphas.
3.2.1 Kosowski et al. (2006)
We use a bootstrap method similar to Kosowski et al. (2006) and operate under the null hypothe-
sis of no true performance in any individual fund. The bootstrap procedure estimates a simulated
distribution of each fund’s alpha. From the distribution of alphas, we can generate a bootstrapped
p-value which allows us to distinguish between luck and skill in the performance of funds. Es-
sentially we want to test the null hypothesis of zero true performance: αi = 0 or t̂α̂i = 0 for each
fund i.
The bootstrap method estimates the distribution by resampling the monthly returns multiple
times with replacement from the original sample and compute the t-statistic of each resample. In
the bootstrap procedure, we use Carhart (1997) four-factor model, which is given by
Ri,t = α̂i + β̂1iMKTt + β̂2iSMBt + β̂3iHMLt + β̂4iPR1Y Rt + ε̂i,t, (4)
to compute ordinary least squares for estimation of alphas, factor loadings and the residuals for
each fund i.
Before the bootstrap procedure we need to retrieve the following coefficients for each fund
i: (α̂i,β̂1,i,β̂2,i,β̂3,i,β̂4,i) and the t-statistic of alpha (t̂α̂). We also save the time series of estimated
residuals: ε̂i,t, where t = Ti0, ..., Ti1 and Ti0 and Ti1 is the dates for the first and last available
monthly return for each fund i.
We draw a random sample with replacements from the funds’ residuals saved from the OLS
regression. Thus creating a pseudo-time series of resampled residuals, ε̂bi,tε where b represent the
bootstrap number (b = 1, . . . ., 1000). Each of the time indices sbTi0, ..., s
b
Ti1
, are drawn randomly
from Ti0, ..., Ti1, where the original sample of each fund are reorganized. The estimated factor
returns remain unchanged and have the same chronological ordering in the constructed dataset.
The next procedure is to impose the null hypothesis of zero true performance in the time series
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of pseudo-monthly returns, αi = 0, by
Rbi,t = 0 + β̂1iMKTt + β̂2iSMBt + β̂3iHMLt + β̂4iPR1Y Rt + ε̂
b
i,tε , (5)
to be able to test if the actual alpha or alpha t-statistic is equal to zero. The returns are regressed
for a given bootstrap sample, b, on the factors from Carhart (1997) four-factor model. A positive
or negative alpha and t-statistic of alpha may be presented if an abnormally high or low number
of residuals are drawn. We repeat this for all the funds i = 1, . . . , 107, which results in a
bootstrapped alpha for each fund. This procedure is then repeated 1000 times. Next, we arrange
the alpha values (α̂bi , i = 1, 2, . . . , 107) and the t-statistic (t̂
b
α̂i, i = 1, 2, . . . , 107) from highest to
lowest value for each bootstrap, b, achieving a result purely from sampling variation. We use the
p-value to see if the bootstrap iteration generate more extreme positive values of estimated alpha
α̂bi or t-statistic of alpha t̂
b
α̂i, compared to those observed in the actual data. We reject the null
hypothesis implying that the sampling variation is the source of high alphas and that the result is
not the result of luck. We calculate the p-value for the funds that generate a positive alpha by
P − V aluei =
∑R
i=1 αî > α̂i
R
, (6)
where i represent each fund individually and we summarize the number of observations where
αi is higher than the estimated alpha, (α̂), and divide it by the number of simulations R. When
we calculate the p-value for the funds that generate a negative alpha we use αî < α̂i in the same
equation.
3.2.2 Fama & French (2010)
In this section, we will focus on the two outer tails of the ranked bootstrap distribution. We follow
a similar approach to Fama & French (2010) to test the null hypothesis of no true performance for
all the funds or the alternative hypothesis that the average alpha for the top or bottom performers
is not equal to zero. Fama & French (2010) suggest a method to sample funds and the explanatory
returns jointly. While Kosowski et al. (2006) perform independent simulations for each fund,
Fama & French (2010) perform a joint sampling of fund returns and the explanatory returns.
Fama & French (2010) argue that the method of Kosowski et al. (2006) does not account for the
correlation of α-estimates by the potential correlation that arises due to the benchmark model not
capturing all common variation in the funds’ return. Thus, the method would result in missing
effects of correlated movement in the volatility of the factor returns and residuals. However,
these accusations are wrong; Kosowski et al. (2006) examine these concerns in their paper.
However, our approach is more comparable with Fama & French (2010) because the minimum
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requirement of observations is more similar than Kosowski et al. (2006).
The methodology is quite similar to the individual bootstrap procedure. However, they differ
in the number of alpha t-statistic for each fund to compute the p-value. In essence, Fama &
French (2010) use the ranked t-statistic and bootstrap results to find the average of a percentile
of the highest or lowest t-statistics to compute the p-value. Further, the p-value allows us to
measure whether the actual performance is perceived as extreme compared to the performance
in the bootstrapped results. For example, if a fraction below 5% of the simulations produces alpha
t-statistics higher than the actual estimates, the result would indicate that a fraction of managers
have skills. The formula for p-value remains as presented above, except that we test the mean of
the best and worst generated alphas and its distribution of statistics under the null hypothesis. We
measure the number of observations where the mean of the groups generated alphas are above
the estimated mean of each simulation and divide it by the number of simulations to estimate the
p-value for the best funds. Further, we count the observations when our test statistic is below the
distribution of this statistic under the null hypothesis to estimate the p-value for the worst funds.
3.3 Harvey & Liu (2020) bootstrap procedures
So far, we have discussed the multiple testing adjustment with single hypotheses tests of Kosowski
et al. (2006) and Fama & French (2010). They evaluate the performance of mutual funds and test
the null hypothesis of zero alpha for all funds, α = 0, to distinguish luck from skill. However,
neither of these procedures assess the probability of falsely declaring that no manager has skill
when some funds display a positive alpha, the Type II error.
First, we introduce the methodology of cutoff t-statistic by Harvey & Liu (2020). By estimat-
ing a statistical threshold to control for luck, we focus on the Type I error rate, the false discovery
rate (FDR). Second, we consider the methodology by Harvey & Liu (2020), incorporating Type
II error rate estimation in multiple testing, allowing us to estimate the Test power. We conduct
the double bootstrap approach and operate under the null hypothesis that a fraction of managers
outperforms or underperform.
3.3.1 Cutoff t-statistic
In the first test, we follow the approach of Harvey & Liu (2020) to test the null hypothesis of
no true performance for all the funds against the multiple alternative hypotheses that a specific
amount of managers is outperforming or underperforming. Table 1 illustrate the various alterna-
tive hypotheses we test.
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In Table 1, i represents the alphas of each of the 107 mutual funds. N represents the number
of alternative hypotheses we want to test. The interpretation of the table is that we test the null
hypothesis of α = 0 for all the funds against the alternative hypothesis, i.e., H2A that the two
best funds have positive alphas. Then, we use the same alternative hypothesis to test whether the
worst performing fund has α < 0 further, whether the two worst funds have α < 0, we repeat for
N alternative hypotheses.
First, we perturb the original data X0 by bootstrapping the time periods through 1.000 sim-
ulations to create an alternative panel of returns Xi. Further, we rank the funds in a descending
order based on their t-statistics, rendering the matrix manageable for us to test multiple alter-
native hypotheses of more than one outperforming fund under the null hypothesis: α = 0. In
the first test, we operate under the prior that zero funds outperform or underperform, given by
p0 = 0. When p0 = 0, the approach is similar to that used in Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama &
French (2010) by creating the ”pseudo” sample of fund returns. As described above, the sample
of returns is applied to each hypothetical level of alternative hypotheses, differing on the prior on
p0, to estimate the cutoff t-statistics between 1.5 to 4.0 with 0.1 increments for each alternative
hypothesis. We can perform the same procedure for negatively performing funds to find the cut-
off t-statistic between -4.0 to -1.5 with 0.1 increments. To estimate cutoff t-statistics, we control






where t represents the cutoffs from 1.5 to 4.0 with 0.1 increments, j represents each simulation,
J represents the total number of simulations, and h is the number of times our bootstrap results
are higher than the threshold. These observations are then summarized and divided by the total
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number of simulations, creating the false discovery rate. We use the number of simulations
to fulfill hj divided by the total number of simulations to generate the False Discovery Rate
per hypothesis. The FDR displays the ratio of false discoveries within the bootstrapped sample
dependant on the alternative hypotheses. A higher number of simulations with the rejection of
H0 displays a higher potential false discovery rate.
Using the FDR and the t-statistics, we can compare the 1.000 simulations of all 107 funds to
identify how many funds receive a t-statistic alpha higher than the cutoff. By identifying whether
or not one or more funds outperform, we can compare these results with the FDR Matrix of each
fund as displayed in Appendix F. The cutoff t-statistic is determined by controlling for a specific
level of FDR. In our analysis, we control for 5 percent of the Type 1 error rate. The result will
be 0.05 FDR at the cutoff t-statistic distribution for all hypotheses HNA .
3.3.2 Double bootstrap - error rates
Harvey & Liu (2020) suggests a double bootstrap procedure which allow us to estimate both error
rates, Type I and Type II. The double bootstrap procedure assumes α 6= 0 on a prior of funds, p0.
The p0 represents a researcher’s or an investor’s prior on the number of out- or underperforming
funds for a given sample. We set a prior on p0 and bootstrap the data a second time. The p0
number of funds retain their respective alphas, and makes it possible to assess the rate of False
Positives and False Negatives in the sample. The double bootstrap approach estimates the rate
at which these errors occur in performance evaluation of mutual funds. The hypotheses in this
method are given by
H0 : αp0 6= 0, (8)
HA : αp0 = 0, (9)
where p0 represents the prior on outperforming or underperforming funds, and where the H0 is
testing for significant alphas based on our prior beliefs. In essence, p0 defines the number of
funds retaining their alpha in the bootstrap, and as a result, we assess whether or not p0 of funds
are outperforming or not.
Table 2 displays the overall testing outcomes of a double bootstrap procedure. FP i,j is an
observation of a false positive identified through i, first bootstrap and j, second bootstrap. TP i,j
is the identification of a true positive outcome from both rounds of bootstraps, TN i,j is the
identification of a true negative outcome and FN i,j is a false negative outcome estimated from
both bootstraps. We use the double bootstrap procedure as we are interested in both Type I and
Type II error rate of our testing procedures. In addition, the double bootstrap simplifies the use
of alternative hypotheses by grouping similar alternative hypotheses. The alternative hypotheses,
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which correspond to a fraction of p0 to be true, are grouped under a singleHA associated with the
P0. Finally, the second-stage bootstrap will allow us to estimate both Type I and Type II errors
nonparametrically.


















Harvey & Liu (2020) suggest the following steps to perform multiple testing with error rates
being assessed. The following itemized paragraph is a direct quote from Harvey & Liu (2020),
p. 2513:
• ”Step I. Bootstrap the time periods and let the bootstrapped panel of returns be Xi. For Xi,
obtain the corresponding 1×N vector of t-statistics ti.
• Step II. Rank the components in ti. For the top p0 of strategies in ti, find the corresponding
strategies in the original data X0. Adjust these strategies so they have the same means as
those for the top p0 of strategies ranked by ti in Xi. Denote the data matrix for the adjusted
strategies by X(i)0,1. For the remaining strategies in X0, adjust them so they have zero mean





new data matrix Yi.
• Step III. Bootstrap the time periods J times. For each bootstrapped sample, calculate the
realized error rates (or odds ratio) for Yi, denote by fi,j (f stands for a generic error rate
that is a function of the testing outcomes).









where I is the number of simulations in the first bootstrap, J is the number of simulations in the
second bootstrap, i represents the observed values from the first bootstrap, and j represent the
observed values from the second bootstrap. Finally, f represents the general parameter for the
different error rates.
We will estimate the error rates that may occur in multiple testing. Type I implies the selec-
tion, with the assumption of skillfulness, of a manager or a strategy that turns out to be unskilled.
Such an error may have variations in economic implications, where a manager may slightly un-
derperform or, worse, have a significant negative return. Thus, the Type I error rate is often
referred to as a false positive. Several methods take the Type I error rate into account, assuming
that this error is the most expensive, economically speaking. Type II error rate is referred to as a
false negative. In essence, the rejection of a manager due to assumed under-performance when
there is not. Harvey & Liu (2020) found that current performance evaluation methods ignore the
Type II error. However, the economic implications of the two error rates may differ considerably.
For example, a lost opportunity may be more costly than accepting a failing strategy, depending
upon the scenario at hand. As of current methods, investors have no current tool to evaluate the
different possible error rates. The lack of an evaluating framework of these error rates is what
Harvey & Liu (2020) present a solution to. The Oratio represents the trade-off between the two
error rates. It provides the rate of false discoveries per miss (Harvey Liu, 2020). Oratio takes the
value and size of p0 into account, thus providing a dynamic representation of the error rates. For
example, using the Oratio as a measure of risk, an investor could say that Type I error rate is ten
times more costly than Type II and thus desire an Oratio of 0.1 to evaluate the cutoff t-statistic
for different values of p0.
We can estimate the error rates for various null hypotheses through the double bootstrap
procedure where a fraction, p0, is assumed outperforming or underperforming. First, we use the





, if FP i,j + TP i,j > 0
0, if FP i,j + TP i,j = 0,
(11)
where i and j represent the first (I) and second (J) bootstrap simulations, respectively, FP is
the estimation of false positives, and TP is the number of true positives. RFDR is the realized
false discovery rate. Further, we take the average across the perturbed data i, and each time
we generate j bootstrapped random samples. We can find the Type I error rate, which is the
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where Type I represent the Type I error rate, I, J, i, j and RFDR are defined as previously men-
tioned.
The realized rate of misses (RMISS), also sometimes referred to as the false omission rate or





, if FN i,j + TN i,j > 0
0, if FN i,j + TN i,j = 0,
(13)
where RMISS is the realized rate of misses, FN is the false negative observations, TN is the
true negative observations and i and j remain as previously defined. RMISS is further used to
find the Type II error rate, which is the possibility of not selecting or missing a manager that









where each variable remain as previously defined in the previous equations.
However, the Type II error rate holds different definitions and interpretations. The Type II
error rate as defined by Harvey & Liu (2020) deviates from the traditional view of Type II error
rate, where traditional error rate provides the possibility of estimating Test power as Test power =
1−Type II. The Type II error rate from Harvey & Liu (2020) does not provide this possibility. To
evaluate the Test power of our analysis, we will estimate the traditional, standard interpretation
of Type II error rate, hereafter defined as S-Type II. We must retain both Type II error rates in
our analyses, as Type II is the rate used in the framework of Harvey & Liu (2020), and we use





, if FN i,j + TP i,j > 0











where the computations differ from Type II by using TP , true positives, in the denominator, the
computation of S-Type II will be used in the empirical analysis for Test power in the section of
Error rates.
With both Type I and Type II error rates from Harvey & Liu (2020), we are able to define the





, if FN i,j > 0
0, if FN i,j = 0,
(17)
where RRATIO is the rate of false discovery to misses, FN is the observed false negative, FP
is the observed false positive and i and j remain as previously defined. We use the RRATIO to









where Oratio represent the odds ratio trade-off between Type I and Type II error rate.
The Type II error rate is the rejection of a mutual fund manager under the assumption of
outperforming or underperforming managers when the opposite is true. In effect, the Type II
error rate tells us a lot about the robustness of a test. The higher the rate of Type II, the higher
the possibility of skill among some managers. The idea is that, instead of controlling the error
rates for all circumstances, the analyses should incorporate the prior beliefs.
4 Data
This section presents the data basis for our computations and analyses on the performance evalu-
ation of Norwegian mutual funds. We explain the different parameters in the thesis and describe
the dataset used for the Empirical Analysis in Section 5. First, we present the sample mutual
funds. Second, we offer the basis for the interest rate, the basis for the selected benchmark, and
the four risk factors in Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. Ultimately, we discuss potential biases
which may occur in the performance evaluation of mutual funds. The dataset of funds’ monthly
returns, risk factors and interest rates are collected from the database of Ødegaard (2019).
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4.1 Sample mutual funds
The data basis is comprised of Norwegian Mutual funds’ financial data from 1987 to 2019. We
have included both surviving and non-surviving funds, but with a minimum of 12 months of
observations. In addition, only funds with a minimum of 80% domestic equities are included
in the sample. Only actively managed funds are included, where passive funds such as index
funds and similar products are omitted from the sample. The dataset contains 107 Norwegian
Mutual funds that met the requirements within the time period stated. The starting point of
observations is set at 1987 due to the highly unstable interest markets before this time. Due to
high volatility and inconsistency in the interest rates, our empirical analysis would be heavily
affected by these instabilities, rendering the analysis less robust. In addition, NIBOR, which is
the Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate, is available historically from this year. Given our focus
on the methodology of the analyses of Norwegian mutual funds, we find using a single interest
rate proxy through the whole dataset complementary to a robust result. We aim to locate error
rates in previous analyses of Norwegian mutual funds. We have an obvious limitation set only to
include the Norwegian mutual Funds data.
Daily Net Asset Value from each fund is retrieved from the TILTON database. This data is
used to calculate the net monthly returns of each fund, providing 12 observations per fund each
year. Net Asset Value (NAV) is a specific fund’s market value per share at a given time. Using
NAV, the monthly return of each fund is calculated by the last observed value of stock for each
month. When adjusting NAV by subtracting dividends and management fees, the net return of
each fund will be provided without the fund-specific incurred costs, creating a comparative table





where monthly return (r) from time t0 to t1 is given by the change in adjusted NAV from the
current month divided by adjusted NAV from the previous month subtracted by 1. Thus, adverse
changes in NAV will result in a loss, whereas a positive return will increase a fund’s market value
per share, providing the fund’s net result for the particular month.
From Appendix D, Mutual Fund Descriptive Statistics, the number of observations per fund
varies greatly. Therefore, even though the life span and other fund statistics are drastically dif-
ferent, all funds are weighted equally to ensure comparability of performance regardless of the
number of observations.
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4.1.1 Historically on the Norwegian fund market
The historical development of the Norwegian fund market is presented in Figure 1. Quantitative
data on assets and customer relationships of Norwegian funds are available from the year 2003,
Verdipapirfondenes Forening (2021). As Norwegian mutual funds are open-ended equity funds,
the data represent a market without accessibility limitations in trading for the individual investor.
The historical data is divided into private and institutional sectors, where the private sector con-
tains data from individual investors and legal individuals. In contrast, the institutional sector is
mainly counties, companies and other administrative entities. ”Total assets managed” are the
total assets managed by a fund at the end of a given year, whereas customer relationships are the
number of individual stakeholders in each fund. One investor may have several customer rela-
tionships, as one individual investor may hold shares in more than one fund at a time, providing
one relationship per ownership of the fund.
The data basis is comprised of Norwegian fund products only. Therefore, we have included
Norwegian funds exclusively, hereby mutual funds, interest funds, hedge funds and bond funds
as the chosen parameters. We aim to show the overall growth and decline in the fund market for
private and institutional investors and highlight the changes in total assets managed and customer
relationships at the end of every year from 2003 to 2020. The graphs are displayed logarithmi-
cally to enclosure both total assets managed and customer relationships in the same frame for
comparative reasons.
There has been an overall decrease in customer relationships in the private sector from 2003
to 2020, with a negative development from 901,796 to 376,347. However, as this is Norwegian
funds exclusively, this could mean that there has been a change in the investment pattern to a more
international investment focus among Norwegian fund customers. It could also be explained by
decreased diversity, as customers could tend to invest in fewer funds than before. However, there
is no information on diversity available due to privacy legislation, and thus remain speculations.
As the number of customer relationships decreases, total assets managed increases steadily over
time, except for 2007 and 2008 where the world’s financial markets suffered from the financial
crisis. Therefore, increased total assets managed and decreased customer relationships represent
increased individual positions, implying that fewer investors invest a higher amount in Norwe-
gian funds.
The institutional sector displays an increase in both assets managed and customer relation-
ships. Total assets managed have experienced a noticeable increase from 47,927,913 in 2003 to
452,000,468 in 2020. This development grows steadily throughout the time period and depicts
a growing market for institutional investors and their interest in the Norwegian fund market.
Customer relationships have also seen a steady increase, resulting in a market in high demand.
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Figure 1: Sector development 2003-2020
Figure 1 shows the development of customer relationship and total assets managed in the Norwegian mu-
tual fund market from 2003-2020. The graphs are displayed logarithmically to ensure they are comparable,
given the large differences in volume between customer relationships and total assets managed. Figure a)
show the development of the private sector in Norwegian mutual funds trading, while Figure b) displays
the development in the institutional sector. The private sector is defined as a private individual making
trades in his or her legal name using the social security number as the identifier. The institutional sector
consist of companies and businesses investing in Norwegian funds through their organizational number,
where the company legally owns the papers on the fund. Institutional actors will also include municipal
administrations, pension saving in businesses, counties and similar. Norwegian mutual funds are in the
analysis defined through the categories predefined by VFF(2021) and further selected: Norwegian mu-
tual funds, Norwegian money market funds, Norwegian combination funds, Norwegian hedge funds, and
Norwegian fixed income funds.
(a) Private Sector
(b) Institutional Sector
Table 3 reports the market development in descriptive statistics, including net fund acquisi-
tion and assets per customer. Net fund acquisition is the acquisition amount of a fund subtracted
redemption from one year to the next. Positive net fund acquisition is a growth in the invested
amount in Norwegian mutual funds overall. Assets per customer is the relative ratio of total as-
sets managed and customer relationships. As the number of customers decreases and total assets
managed increases, assets per customer increase over time, pointing towards managing increas-
ingly more prominent positions from the individual customer. For institutional customers, the
tendencies are the same as in the private sector, increasing assets per customer. However, insti-
tutional customers report a more steadily positive net acquisition. Due to institutional customers
may not being as sensitive to market movement, they increase net fund acquisition over time,
showing a more robust market for growth.
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Table 3: Private and institutional customers - Norwegian fund instruments only
The table presents descriptive statistics from the VFF database (2021) for the Norwegian mutual fund
market by selecting Norwegian money market funds, Norwegian combination funds, Norwegian hedge
funds, and Norwegian fixed income funds. The table displays yearly key information regarding the overall
fund market for private actors. The sample contains a larger variety of funds to display the overall growth
in the market of funds of Norwegian origin. The second part of the table displays the institutional sector,
showing key information regarding trading Norwegian mutual and other funds for institutional investors,
companies, municipalities, and counties. International funds are omitted from the sample to create a
Norwegian product focus.
Year Customer Total assets Assets Net fund
relationships managed per customer acquisition
Private
2003 901,796 40,888,678 45 762,152
2004 833,884 44,794,097 54 -972,475
2005 777,259 77,434,560 100 24,516,594
2006 763,655 64,764,823 85 -18,118,968
2007 754,277 67,098,959 89 59,866
2008 724,086 43,897,919 61 -9,739,150
2009 735,225 58,174,630 79 4,166,038
2010 701,601 73,783,700 105 560,663
2011 653,494 67,455,912 103 153,801
2012 607,521 71,706,382 118 2,855,966
2013 483,217 54,424,178 113 9,900
2014 449,971 58,878,240 131 1,997,753
2015 423,087 64,962,374 154 1,849,955
2020 416,528 72,701,752 175 3,412,706
2017 398,763 87,965,536 221 10,652,785
2018 385,468 93,096,105 242 -2,661,965
2019 376,820 102,907,202 273 3,328,981
2020 376,347 77,328,966 205 -385,108
Institutional
2003 11,290 47,927,913 4,245 6,926,678
2004 10,593 55,573,515 5,246 7,509,428
2005 10,431 68,394,241 6,557 8,603,788
2006 11,047 87,327,160 7,905 14,822,526
2007 3,959 28,656,363 7,238 158,285
2008 12,807 106,699,589 8,331 -3,528,530
2009 13,677 113,190,251 8,276 11,265,625
2010 14,276 150,745,868 10,559 15,188,860
2011 14,582 157,078,411 10,772 13,314,336
2012 15,043 184,983,408 12,297 19,390,427
2013 15,226 184,837,638 12,140 -9,307,861
2014 15,586 266,402,397 17,092 72,700,951
2015 16,962 273,654,221 16,133 12,180,953
2020 19,250 296,147,782 15,384 11,056,879
2017 20,899 335,221,802 16,040 22,811,577
2018 22,885 324,206,231 14,167 2,853,590
2019 25,207 377,305,828 14,968 33,373,969
2020 26,246 452,000,468 17,222 20,057,986
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4.2 Risk-free rate
To calculate the excess return of each fund, we have to account for the risk-free rate in the
market. Ødegaard (2011) argues that NIBOR, Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate, serves as a
suitable proxy for risk-free rates in calculating the excess return of Norwegian mutual funds.
NIBOR serves as the guiding rate used for unsecured money lending between banks. The his-
torical development of NIBOR from 1987 to 2019 is displayed in Appendix A. As previously
mentioned, the data period of NIBOR will range from 1987 to 2019 due to ”chaotic” rates in the
period before 1987, such as a Norwegian currency crisis which would create irregularities in our
analyses. By using monthly NIBOR interest rates, the risk-free rate to be deducted is calculated
as
rf = (1 +NIBOR)
1
12−1, (20)
where rf represent the risk-free rate and NIBOR represent the Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate
at a given time.
4.3 Benchmark index
In assessing mutual fund performance, the excess return of the funds must be compared to a
benchmark. The Oslo Stock Exchange provides various benchmarks. The Oslo Stock Exchange
Mutual Fund Index (OSEFX) mirrors the movement of the stocks on the Oslo Stock Exchange
following the UCITS standards. These standards include rules for diversification and limitations
on the weight of the most extensive stocks on the exchange. The UCITS standard is part of an
EU directive that aims to standardize and harmonize the management and sales of mutual funds.
Therefore, the OSEFX benchmark would be a suitable benchmark in our analyses. However,
the benchmark is relatively new, first introduced in 1995. For analytical purposes, our compu-
tations and comparisons require one benchmark to be used throughout the whole data period,
and OSEFX is thus unsuitable. The Oslo Stock Exchange All-Share Index (OSEAX) serves our
purpose and contains every stock listed on Oslo Stock Exchange adjusted for dividends and daily
corrections by corporate actions. In our analyses, we will be using OSEAX as the Market proxy
with a weighted portfolio reflecting close to all shares on the Oslo Stock Exchange, except for
the least traded. Figure 2 illustrates the cumulative return of OSEAX for the entire time period
we investigate.
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Figure 2: Cumulative return on OSEAX
This figure plots the cumulative return of OSEAX from 1987 to 2019. It illustrates the benchmark devel-
opment in a logarithmic scale.
4.4 Risk factors
The risk factors in the Carhart (1997) four-factor model are collected from empirical data on
Oslo Stock Exchange in Ødegaard’s (2019) database. The factors of the model were described
previously in the methodology Section 3.1. We have retrieved and applied the Market factor
(MKT) and the Small-Minus-Big (SMB), that companies with a low average market value have
a different return than companies with high market value. We also apply the value factor, High-
Minus-Low (HML), the yield of companies with high book to marked ratio subtracted for the
return of companies with low book to market ratio. Finally, the Momentum factor (PR1YR)
considers that stocks with changing values will continue to have a changing value in the future.
These factors enable us to calculate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS regression) using time series
data from different factors to estimate the Carhart (1997) four-factor model.
Figure 3 illustrate the factor returns from 1987 to 2019 with cumulative returns. By assessing
the cumulative return for the factors over the entire period from 1987 to 2019, the factor that
produces the highest accumulated return is the Market factor (MKT). MKT is also the most
volatile, delivering the highest standard deviation throughout the period. The HML reports the
lowest cumulative returns from approximately 2010 and decreasing returns from 2000, indicating
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Figure 3: Cumulative return on factors
This figure plots the cumulative return from Carhart’s (1997) factors from 1987 to 2019. This illustrates the
impact of the Market factor, Small-Minus-Big, High-Minus-Low and Momentum factor in a logarithmic
scale.
that companies with a high book to market value produce lower yields than the companies with a
low book to market value. The SMB and the PR1YR factors display stable positive growth from
the mid-1990s, where PR1YR eventually surpassed the SMB factor.
Table 4 reports various statistics for the factors in the entire sample period, divided into three
different time periods at 11 years each. In Panel A, the mean factor returns are presented. All
factors except the HML generate exclusively positive mean returns. The negative return from
2009-2019 (-4,764) in the HML factor implies, as stated in Figure 3 that companies with low
book to market had higher yield than companies with high book to market value. The SMB
factor generates positive mean returns in every period indicating that small firms generate higher
yields than big firms. There is less of a difference from 2009 to 2019. The Momentum factor
(PR1YR) produced the highest generated mean return in every period and contained the highest
generated mean return (13,579) in 2009-2019. The high generated mean return in the Momentum
factor can be described by the high growth from the financial crisis in 2008 and supplemented by
easier access to trading platforms, which may have created synergies that affect the Momentum
factor.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of factors
The table below illustrates summary statistics for the Carhart (1997) four-factor model in the full sample
period and three different periods: 1987-2019, 1987-1997, 1998-2008 and 2009-2019. The time periods
consist of 11 years and start from January to December. Panel A reports the annualized mean return, Panel
B reports the standard deviation, Panel C reports the maximum and minimum to each factor in percent,
and Panel D reports the correlation between all the factors.
MKT SMB HML PR1YR
Panel A: Mean factor return
Jan 1987-Dec2019 7.094 7.853 2.079 8.674
Jan 1987-Dec1997 7.263 10.418 9.790 1.272
Jan 1998-Dec2008 2.428 11.874 1.213 11.170
Jan 2009-Dec2019 11.591 1.268 -4.764 13.579
Panel B: Standard deviation
Jan 1987-Dec2019 20.736 14.159 16.177 16.305
Jan 1987-Dec1997 22.741 15.755 18.199 17.234
Jan 1998-Dec2008 24.178 14.239 17.798 17.559
Jan 2009-Dec2019 13.829 12.165 11.494 13.755
Panel C: Max(min) factor returns
Jan 1987-Dec2019 16.5(-28.7) 22.1(-17.1) 14.7(-16.7) 15.4(-16.8)
Jan 1987-Dec1997 16.5(-28.7) 22.1(-10.5) 14.7(-15.7) 13.5(-16.8)
Jan 1998-Dec2008 11.8(-24.6) 13.3(-17.1) 9.3(-16.7) 15.4(-14.2)
Jan 2009-Dec2019 14.9(-9.0) 12.6(-11.0) 6.9(-7.4) 12.1(-16.1)
Panel D: Factor correlation matrix
MKT 1 -0.448 0.051 -0.157
SMB -0.448 1 -0.138 0.105
HML 0.051 -0.138 1 -0.118
PR1YR -0.157 0.105 -0.118 1
Panel B reports the standard deviation in percentage for the factors. The factors generate
stable standard deviations in almost every period. Only the last period displays factors with a
significantly smaller standard deviation, which implies that the volatility of the factors decreased
in the last period. The same results are reported in Panel C, which displays the maximum and
minimum factor returns. The results show that SMB generated the highest maximum factor
return in the first period and that HML generated the lowest maximum factor return in the final
period. Panel C also show that MKT generated the highest negative factor return for all the
factors in the first period.
Panel D reports the correlation between factors. The results in the matrix display little corre-
lation between the factors except for the negative correlation of -0,448 between the MKT and the
SMB factor. This correlation implies that the SMB factor will decrease with almost half the same
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return when the Market factor return increases. This result is confirmed through the mean factor
returns for the different time periods between MKT and SMB, where they change in different
directions.
4.5 Potential biases
In performance evaluation of mutual funds, there could arise several potential biases that should
be accounted for. In performance evaluation of mutual funds, there is the possibility of survivor-
ship bias, introduced by Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992), where they analyzed
the relationship between volatility and returns. Their analysis was performed onto a sample
containing possible survivorship biases, and their results pointed towards the appearance of pre-
dictability. In essence, the potential loss of representative results when removing short period
lasting funds creates the basis for this bias. If funds with a short lifespan were omitted, these
funds may potentially possess a high probability of underperformance before their termination.
Therefore, the funds with a short life span will have a significant negative impact on the over-
all fund performance in the market. The market analyses would report a falsely high return
by excluding these observations as the worst funds are omitted from the sample. In addition,
these funds are assumed to have a poor or failing strategy due to their alleged underperformance.
When assessing management performance in the mutual fund market, the fund’s strategy is vital
in identifying performance. By omitting a fund’s return, the strategy itself will be omitted from
the analysis (Elton, Gruber and Blake, 1996). In this effect, the remaining funds in the sample
would consist of more or less successful strategies only, creating an upward-biased sample.
Our sample has a minimum requirement of 12 observations for each fund and is thus suscep-
tible to look-ahead bias and even survivorship bias. Look-ahead bias may occur when month-end
returns are missing or a requirement of observations is imposed. A fund with a short life span
may be excluded from the sample due to the sampling conditions, resulting in the loss of po-
tentially underperforming funds in the sample. These funds may be terminated within a short
period due to management costs not covering the funds’ expenses or being too high to compete.
It could also be due to underperformance on the funds’ return. Nevertheless, the omitted funds
may affect the sample’s overall return, creating a bias when omitted. Our minimum requirement
of 12 observations may impose look-ahead bias regarding the funds’ life span, but not its size.
Funds are rarely directly dissolved, often merged with other funds, thus assuming the money
from dissolved funds as transferred directly to another fund (Elton et al., 1996). By this assump-
tion, the minimum requirement of 12 observations should not create any look-ahead bias due to
the money still in circulation and its losses and gains incorporated by another fund in the sample.
The third potential bias may occur when funds perform a pre-release, not open to the public, onto
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mutual funds databases for seed money, creating incubation bias (Fama & French, 2010). The
fund may create an artificially high increase in market share value during and after this period,
rendering the fund’s returns disproportionate to the overall sample of funds.
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of fund return and benchmark
The table reports various descriptive statistics for the fund returns and the benchmark for a equally
weighted portfolio, consisting of Oslo Børs All Share Index(OSEAX), all funds in the sample, the sur-
viving funds today (alive) and the non-surviving funds today (dead). All numbers are in percentages (%).
The two first columns report the mean return and standard deviation annualized, following the kurtosis
(not excess) and skewness of each portfolio and finally the maximum and minimum are annualized. In
Panel A, we display the whole sample period. Panel B, C and D display time periods at 11 years interval;
1987-1997, 1998-2008 and 2009-2019.
Mean ret. Std.dev Kurt. Skew. Max. Min.
Panel A: 1987-2019
OSEAX 12.378 20.618 2.836 -0.987 17.445 -27.423
All 12.597 20.635 2.113 -0.812 17.546 -25.277
Alive 13.709 20.808 2.042 -0.793 18.648 -25.391
Dead 10.916 20.967 2.117 -0.793 18.145 -25.088
Panel B: 1987-1997
OSEAX 16.459 22.620 2.623 -1.061 17.445 -27.423
All 17.848 21.066 0.955 -0.572 17.546 -19.560
Alive 19.813 21.534 0.826 -0.599 18.648 -17.031
Dead 16.225 21.395 1.395 -0.601 18.145 -21.477
Panel C: 1998-2008
OSEAX 7.489 23.990 1.683 -0.984 12.489 -23.934
All 5.378 24.934 1.427 -0.951 13.821 -25.277
Alive 6.363 24.993 1.443 -0.922 16.112 -25.391
Dead 4.407 25.024 1.422 -0.957 14.102 -25.088
Panel D: 2009-2019
OSEAX 13.186 13.827 0.914 0.086 15.047 -8.841
All 14.566 14.540 1.597 0.016 15.541 -10.401
Alive 14.951 14.468 1.611 0.030 15.616 -10.324
Dead 12.144 15.192 1.269 0.045 15.417 -10.581
To address the potential biases, we will display fund returns with segregation between alive
and dead funds. In Table 5 we have displayed the descriptive statistics for all funds, whether
surviving and non-surviving, as well as the benchmark OSEAX. The results are displayed pe-
riodically in intervals of 11 years and the overall summary from 1987-2019. For the 11 year
periods and all-time, the mean return of non-surviving funds is consistently lower than the mean
return of the benchmark index. In contrast, surviving funds are consistently higher, except for
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1998-2008. Panel C displays the period of 1998-2008, which contain the worldwide financial
crisis. This is reflected in the mean returns of the different portfolios, where the benchmark is
outperforming the others. The other panels present the alive funds exceeding the other portfo-
lios and the dead funds underperforming. This is consistent with our previous assumption that
non-surviving funds are mainly dissolved due to underperformance.
Figure 4: Cumulative returns
Figure 4 shows the periodically changes in benchmark (OSEAX), all funds, alive funds and dead funds.
Panels B, C and D depict the changes in an 11 year window, and the graph represent the overall cumulative
return of the different variables. Panel A represent the whole time period from 1987-2019. The method of
periodically segregating the development, allow the assessment of the differences in growth at a shorter
time span to produce more insight into substantial differences between the factors.
Figure 4 display four sets of graphical development of the cumulative returns in the time pe-
riods, illustrating the development of OSEAX, alive funds, dead funds and all funds. Cumulative
return is the aggregated change in return over a given period of time. Panel A displays an overall
higher development of cumulative returns of alive funds compared to the others. This tendency
is also visible in Panels B and D. Panel C (1998-2008) is the exception, as previously stated.
Dead funds are persistently lower in cumulative return compared to alive funds and all funds,
respectively. With survivorship bias in mind, the omittance of these non-surviving funds would
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affect our sample upward-biased. Our sample includes both surviving and non-surviving funds,
thus combating the survivorship bias.
By our requirement on a minimum of 12 observations, we combat the possibility of survivor-
ship bias and look-ahead bias. Our basis for setting the minimum at 12 is to create a robust sample
with a representative selection of funds. If a fund has less than 12 observations, we assume that
the fund has gone through troubles of extraordinary measures and is thus not representative of
the overall sample. We have also gathered information about limitations from previous work to
assess what will be the optimal requirement. Fama & French (2010) have 8 observations, and
Sørensen (2011) has a minimum of 17 in his sample. Kosowski et al. (2006) found that observa-
tions did not significantly differ for the results when changing from 18 to 120 observations. Fama
& French (2010) argue that funds with less than 8 observations have extreme volatility in their
respective alphas. Based upon previous work, we operate with 12 observations as our minimum
requirement.
5 Empirical analysis
In this section, we present our empirical results on the performance of Norwegian mutual funds.
First, we present the results on the aggregate level using the CAPM model (Jensen, 1968), the
three-factor model (Fama & French, 1993) and the four-factor model (Carhart, 1997). Second,
we use the bootstrap methods of Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama & French (2010) to determine
whether the fund managers’ performance is due to skill or luck. Finally, we conduct the double
bootstrap method by Harvey & Liu (2020) to estimate the Type II error and assess the Test power.
5.1 Aggregate fund performance
The choice of model depends upon the significance of the factors in the different performance
models. By comparing the factors in an OLS regression analysis, we receive the aggregated level
of the equally weighted portfolio and the following statistical significance level for each factor.
We have divided the analysis into time periods to see which performance model receives the
highest statistical significance for each time period. The regression analysis displays the funds’
return dependant upon the factors, differing from one to four factors, depending upon the method
used. We will focus on the three models featured in the methods of Kosowski et al. (2006), Fama
& French (1993) and Harvey & Liu (2020). Table 6 display the models CAPM, Fama & French
(2010) three-factor model and Carhart (1997) four-factor model with their respective selection
of explanatory parameters and the following measure of significance provided in the parenthe-
ses. The models differ in factors where we include the Market factor (MKT), Small-Minus-Big
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(SMB), High-Minus-Low (HML) and the Momentum factor (PR1YR) varying between the mod-
els.
In Table 6 we see the results of the regression. In Panel A, CAPM displays an alpha of
0.501 with a t-statistic of 0.485, which is nonsignificant. However, the Market factor produces
a high significance with a t-statistic of 67.10. The alphas in Panel A for all three models do not
generate statistical significance in their t-statistics, thus revealing that none of the listed models
can provide an alpha with high statistical significance of abnormally high returns over 1987-
2019 on the aggregated level. Further, the Fama & French (1993) three-factor model includes
the SMB and HML in addition to the alpha and the Market factor (MKT). Panel A displays a
decrease in alpha to -0.379 for the CAPM with a nonsignificant t-statistic. However, the factors
of this model display statistical significance at the 1 percent level. The Carhart (1997) four-factor
model further includes Momentum (PR1YR) and displays an alpha of 0.035. MKT, SMB and
HML factors produce significance at the 1 percent level, while the Momentum factor presents
significance at the 5 percent level. The increase in alpha from Fama & French to Carhart is
evidence of positive growth in alpha by adding the Momentum factor, increasing funds’ overall
aggregated return over the time period.
In the different time periods, the models’ values vary greatly in impact and statistical signif-
icance. Panel B displays significance at 1 percent for the MKT and SMB in all models. The
HML and PR1YR does not generate statistical significance at any level below 10 percent and
produce low levels of statistical significance for the funds’ aggregated return in 1987-1997. In
addition, the alphas remain statistically nonsignificant. Panel C returns overall negative alphas
for all methods. The negative alpha from Fama & French’s (1993) three-factor model is the only
statistically significant alpha in the table. It depicts an extensive underperformance in the Nor-
wegian mutual funds market for this method in the time period 1998-2008. All factors display
significance at the 1 percent level during this time period and are seen as significantly explana-
tory towards the negative alphas received. The time period ends in 2008 and is thus affected by
the financial crisis at the end of the time period. Panel D contains overall positive alphas, with
CAPM producing the highest. None of these models generate statistically significant alphas.
However, we find that the MKT factor is robust at a 1 percent level for all methods.
In summary, we see that the CAPM model produces high alpha values either negatively or
positively in all panels. By only including one explanatory variable, the alpha seems to generate
higher values. By adding more factors, we see the alpha moving further towards zero in all time
periods. In this effect, the more factors we include, the less significance and impact from the
alpha on the funds aggregated returns. In the choice of benchmark method, significant impact
values are of high importance to substantially explain the development in the market. For Panel
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A 1987-2019, the Carhart four-factor model display significance for all four factors for the whole
time period. In this effect, the Carhart model is the preferred approach to provide the most robust
regressional analysis with the highest significance of impact towards the alpha.
Table 6: Equally weighted portfolio alphas and factor loadings
The table displays the aggreagate performance where the columns present the alpha, factor loadings and
adjusted R square for an equally weighted portfolio. We present the results for the three different factor
models; CAPM, Fama & French and Carhart. The stars represent the statistical significance 1%***,5%**
and 10%* and the alphas are annualized and in percent. For Panel A display results for the whole time
period. Panel B-D displays equally sub periods; 1987-1997, 1998-2008 and 2009-2019.










































































































5.2 Methodology of Kosowski et al. (2006)
The previous section found that the Norwegian mutual fund managers could not produce a sta-
tistically significant alpha on an aggregate level. This section will evaluate if any of the fund
managers can beat their benchmark index individually. When conducting a multiple test, some
funds will perform well, and some will perform poorly in any given sample. The bootstrap pro-
cedure in this section will consider lucky or unlucky performances in the sample. The method
by Kosowski et al. (2006) allows us to examine individually whether the actual alpha is different
from zero in the bootstrapped distribution of alphas by the null hypothesis of zero alpha for all
funds. The procedure allows us to distinguish luck from skill and whether skilled or unskilled
mutual fund managers exist in the market. We will also compare the results from the boot-
strapped p-value with the standard parametric p-value on how the conclusions on significance
will differentiate between the two tests.
We will look for statistical significance in the two different performance measures, alpha and
the t-statistic of alpha, in all the mutual funds individually. Table 7 represents the results from
the bootstrap procedure where we use the alpha α in the first column and t-statistic of alpha tα
in the second column. The funds are ranked by their respective alpha t-statistic, where Panel A;
presents the 15 best funds and Panel B; presents the 15 worst funds. The third column contains
the parametric p-value of each fund, and the fourth column represents their bootstrapped p-value.
Further, Appendix E presents the 107 Norwegian mutual funds individually with their two
separate performance measurements, alpha in row 1 and t-statistic of alpha in row 2. The table
also reports the parametric p-value in row 3 and the bootstrapped p-value in row 4. The funds are
sorted based on their alpha t-statistic. To evaluate whether the performance of any of the funds
is based on luck or stock-picking skills, we look for statistical significance using the alpha and t-
statistic of the alpha of the mutual funds. E.g., if we want to evaluate whether the best performing
fund displays stock-picking skill in contrast to a lucky performance on the 5% significance level,
at least 5% of the generated alphas in the 1000 simulations must be higher than the observed
alpha in the four-factor model. Equivalently, for the worst-performing funds, if the performance
is due to a lack of stock-picking skills. At least 5% of the generated alphas need to be lower
than the observed alpha in the four-factor model rendering the bad performance due to a lack of
stock-picking skills.
In Table 7 we can see that the top 15 funds with positive alphas beat their benchmark. If we
look closer at the top-performing funds, FIRST Norge Fokus (FNK) display an alpha of 10.95,
the 2nd highest fund Landkreditt Utbytte 1 (LU1), display an alpha of 7.62 and the 3rd FORTE
Trønder (FTB) with an alpha of 6.18. The top 3 performing funds exhibit nonsignificant alphas as
their respective bootstrapped p-values are above the threshold of 0.05. However, LU1 displays a
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bootstrap p-value of 0.10, lower than the bootstrapped p-value of the other top-performing funds
with 0.79 and 0.62, respectively, yet it remains nonsignificant. Furthermore, all the top 15 funds
exhibit positive alphas, and we fail to reject the null hypothesis of zero performance for all of
them.
When we look at the funds with negative alphas, we can reject the null hypothesis of no
true performance on a 5% significance level for all of them, except for the worst-performing
fund Skandia SMB Norge (SSM), with an alpha of -12.25. SSM displays a bootstrapped p-
value of 0.16, above the threshold of 0.05, indicating no evidence towards a lack of skill. Our
result shows that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of zero performance for the managers that
generate positive alpha. Their performance resulted from lucky performances rather than the
display of stock-picking skills. However, we reject the null hypothesis of zero performance for
all managers that generate a negative alpha, except for SSM. The result implies that their bad
performances are not a result of unlucky performances rather the absence of skill.
The evaluation of t-statistics of alpha presented in column two provides a conclusion similar
to the deduction of the alpha values. The top-performing funds, according to t-statistics of alpha
does not display significance in their bootstrapped p-value. Thus their performances remain,
as previously concluded, a result of luck. The 7th best performing fund (LU1) has the lowest
bootstrapped p-value of 0.10. This value is still nonsignificant on a 5% level, failing to reject
the null hypothesis. Our results still conclude that the performance of all the funds exhibiting a
positive alpha t-statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis.
Among the funds that fail to beat their benchmark and exhibit negative t-statistics of alpha,
the conclusion is the same as for alphas. All funds with negative alpha t-statistics, except for one
fund, reject the null hypothesis. The bottom fund (SSM), which now is the worst-performing
fund with a t-statistic of alpha at -3.22, generates a bootstrapped p-value of 0.16, failing to reject
the null. This result indicates that their performance is rather unlucky, not by a lack of stock-
picking skills. Thus, based on the evidence, all positive t-statistics of alpha fail to reject the
null hypothesis indicating no evidence of stock-picking skills. In contrast, we can reject the null
hypothesis for the mutual funds that generate a negative t-statistic of alpha, implying that the bad
performances are due to a lack of stock-picking skills.
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Table 7: Baseline bootstrapped results
The table below present the individual bootstrapped results from Kosowski et al. (2006) baseline boot-
strap. The results presented in Panel A for the top 15 funds and Panel B for the bottom 15 funds ranked
on their alpha t-statistic. Column two present the estimated alpha for each fund, column three; the ranked
alpha t-statistics, column four; the parametric p-value and column five; the bootstrapped p-value.
α αt p-value Boot p-value
Panel A: Top 15 funds
Danske Invest Norge Aksj. Inst 1 3.02 2.23 0.01 0.80
FIRST Norge Fokus 10.95 2.19 0.01 0.50
Landkreditt Utbytte 5.38 2.15 0.02 0.35
Fondsfinans Norge 3.78 1.94 0.03 0.37
Danske Invest Norge Aksj. Inst 2 3.26 1.94 0.03 0.21
PLUSS Markedsverdi (Fondsforv) 1.95 1.83 0.03 0.21
Landkreditt Utbytte I 7.62 1.82 0.03 0.10
FORTE Trønder 6.18 1.43 0.08 0.66
Storebrand Norge I 1.60 1.36 0.09 0.64
Storebrand Norge Fossilfri 4.18 1.24 0.11 0.78
Storebrand Optima Norge 1.72 1.19 0.12 0.77
Landkreditt Norge 3.19 1.15 0.12 0.69
Carnegie Aksje Norge 1.78 1.15 0.13 0.62
DNB Norge R 6.11 1.11 0.13 0.55
Danske Invest Norge II 1.39 1.07 0.14 0.60
Panel B: Bottom 15 funds
DNB Norge -1.21 -1.44 0.08 0.03
DNB Norge (Avanse II) -1.72 -1.53 0.08 0.03
Fokus Barnespar -11.89 -1.67 0.07 0.01
Alfred Berg Vekst -8.95 -1.72 0.06 0.01
Globus Norge II -8.34 -1.73 0.05 0.02
GAMBAK Oppkjøp -18.62 -1.81 0.04 0.02
Danske Invest Aktiv Formuesf. A -19.06 -1.89 0.04 0.02
Globus Norge -8.54 -1.99 0.04 0.01
Alfred Berg Aksjef Norge -3.32 -2.03 0.03 0.02
Alfred Berg Aksjespar -4.98 -2.14 0.02 0.02
GJENSIDIGE AksjeSpar -4.28 -2.45 0.01 0.00
Nordea SMB -6.44 -2.63 0.00 0.01
GJENSIDIGE Invest -5.31 -2.96 0.00 0.00
Nordea SMB II -16.93 -3.18 0.00 0.02
Skandia SMB Norge -12.25 -3.22 0.00 0.16
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The result would be different if we used the generated parametric p-value instead of the
bootstrap p-value to test the null hypotheses. Some of the top-performing mutual funds ranked on
their alpha t-statistic display parametric p-values below 5%. We would reject the null hypothesis,
implying that these mutual fund managers possess stock-picking skills. In Table 7, seven of the
funds exhibiting positive alpha t-statistics have display p-values below 0.05. Implying that we
would reject the null hypothesis of zero performance for outperforming managers, resulting in
Norwegian mutual fund managers with stock-picking skills through the traditional method of the
parametric p-value.
When we use the parametric p-value to assess the underperforming funds ranked on their t-
statistics of alpha, the results deviate from the bootstrap test. Some of the worst-performing funds
exhibit parametric p-values above 0.05, implying zero performance for the worst-performing
funds. These results would imply that the bad performance of mutual fund managers is not a con-
sequence of bad stock-picking skills, rather unlucky performances. We would thus experience a
contradiction towards the results from the bootstrap baseline, which illustrates the importance of
the procedure developed by Kosowski et al. (2006).
Figure 5 present the distribution of unconditional four-factor alphas for the top performing
5%, 10% and 20% of funds on the left side of the panel. The bottom performing 5%, 10% and
20% are displayed on the right side. The dashed red line represents the previously estimated
t-statistic of alpha. Panel A1 displays the distribution of the top-performing fund (Danske Invest
Norge Aksj. Inst 1). From the distribution presented in the graph, the probability of observing
a t-statistic of 2.23 is very likely. Which implies that we would not be able to reject the null
hypothesis for this fund. Thus, the performance is based on luck rather than skills.
The distribution displayed in Figure 5 present the alpha t-statistic of a specific mutual fund,
generated under the null hypothesis of zero performance in our benchmark factor model and
simulated 1000 times. We can only reject the null hypothesis if the original alpha t-statistic is
unlikely (less than 5% chance) to be simulated. As a result, we can see that the rest of the alpha
t-statistics in Panel A are likely to be observed in the distributions. Therefore, we are not able to
reject the null hypothesis for these panels.
Panel B1 represents the bottom fund with an estimated alpha t-statistic of -3.22. The esti-
mated alpha t-statistics lie within the simulated distribution, and we fail to reject the null hy-
pothesis. As previously demonstrated, the worst performing fund is not a case of bad stock-
picking skills but an unlucky performance. Panel B2 displays the distribution of simulated alpha
t-statistics that lie approximately between -1.8 and -1. The observed alpha t-statistic of -1.73 is
within the 5% rejection area, and we can reject the null hypothesis. This result is the same for
Panel B3 and B4 and is representative for the rest of the funds with negative alpha t-statistics.
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Figure 5: Bootstrapped distribution vs estimated t-statistic of alpha
The panels display the Kernel density of alpha distribution when using bootstrapped unconditional four-
factor t-statistics represented by the solid line. The dashed red line represent the estimated funds t-statistic.
Panel A reports the right tail of the distribution as Panel B reports the left tail of the distribution. The
statistics are computed from 1000 bootstrap resamples and ranked on their t-statistics of alpha.
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Panel B1-B4 all reject the null hypothesis with bootstrapped p-values lower than 0.05. Given
that only one of the 62 funds that exhibit a negative alpha t-statistic fails to reject the null hypoth-
esis, the evidence towards lack of skill among the underperforming funds is clear. The evidence
agree with the results of both Kosowski et al. (2006) and Sørensen (2011); an absence of skill
causes abnormal negative performance.
5.3 Methodology of Fama & French (2010)
We evaluated if any of the 107 mutual fund managers individually display skills to beat their
benchmark model in the previous method. We got the same result as in the aggregate perfor-
mance. We cannot find any statistically significant evidence that any mutual fund managers beat
their benchmark through stock-picking skills. The methodology by Fama & French (2010) al-
lows us to evaluate statistical significance for the best and worst-performing funds ranked on
their t-statistic in a joint test. We follow the same conditions as the previous test, allowing us to
test for significance under zero alpha for the specific funds. We use the Carhart (1997) four-factor
model as our factor benchmark model. The test evaluates the 5 best and 5 worst funds ranked by
alpha t-statistics. We have jointly sampled the group of funds and their explanatory returns. We
describe the methodology of the procedure in Section 3. The procedure lets us evaluate whether
the grouped best or worst mutual fund managers exhibit skill or luck in their performances. At
the same time, we consider the possibility of correlation between the simulated alphas. Such
correlation may be a result of the benchmark factor model failing to capture all the external
variations.
Table 8: Bootstrap jointly result
The table present the average alpha t-statistic for the 5 best and 5 worst funds ranked on their t-static. The
bootstrapped p-value is jointly sampled for all the 5 funds to account for correlation in the alpha.







In this test, we evaluate the t-statistics of alphas. Fama & French (2010) promote t-statistics
rather than the estimated alpha, as it considers the precision with which alpha is estimated. Table
8 tells us that the bootstrapped p-value for the 5 best funds is not significant with a p-value equal
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to 0.484, far above the required significance level of 0.05 for p-value significance. As a result,
we are not able to reject the null hypothesis of zero alpha. On the other hand, the average t-
statistic of 2.09 is pretty likely to be observed when the null hypothesis is true, as we can see
from Figure 6 where the estimated t-statistic is located close to the center of the distribution. The
result further indicates that the alpha t-statistic originates from luck rather than skill. We are still
not able to detect skills among managers.
Figure 6: Bootstrapped jointly distribution
The figure shows the density distribution of average alpha t-statistics for the top 5 best performing funds
and the bottom 5 worst performing funds in the first bootstrap. The distribution displays the average alpha
t-stat for the 5 funds in question. The figure on the left contains the alpha t-stat observations of the top
5 best funds, and the red line represent the alpha of the top 1 best performing fund from the ranked t-
statistics table. The figure on the right contains the distribution of the top 5 worst performing funds alpha
t-stat. The number of observations is 1000 for both graphs due to the bootstrap of 1000 simulations in the
analysis. The red line representing the worst 1 performing fund is displayed far to the left of the figure
and appears outside the distribution.
Further, Table 8 shows the bootstrapped p-value for the 5 worst funds equal to 0.004, which
is highly significant. Hence this alpha t-statistic is unlikely to be observed if the null hypothesis
is true and we can reject the null hypothesis. We could easily reject the null hypothesis based on
the density distribution in Figure 6 by the average alpha t-statistic of -1.53. The result contributes
with evidence, similarly to the previous tests, that the worst mutual fund managers lack skill, and
the poor result is not a result of unlucky performances. A problem with this joint test is that the
worst-performing fund based on alpha t-statistic, Skandia SMB Norge, is wrongly convicted of
being unskilled. In Figure 7 they fail to exhibit a significant bootstrapped p-value, indicating that
their performance was unlucky. However, the results contribute to our previous test as we can
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detect underperforming managers. The results coincide with Sørensen’s (2009) on Norwegian
mutual funds and Fama & French’s (2010) on US mutual funds.
Figure 7: Simulated vs actual alpha t-statistic
The figure illustrate the simulated alpha t-statistics from our bootstrap approach vs the actual alpha t-
statistic. The two vertical lines illustrates the bottom and top 5 funds in the distribution. The four-factor
model is used to compute the t-statistics of alphas for the entire sample period; 1987-2019
Figure 7 compares the density of the simulated alpha t-statistics from our bootstrap approach
versus the generated alpha t-statistic. The actual t-statistic is estimated in the factor model for
each fund without the assumption of zero performance, from Equation 4. The simulated distri-
bution display more mass of probability on the t-statistics close to zero, whereas the generated
t-statistic of alpha display more mass of probability in the tails. The vertical lines distinguish the
bottom and top 5 funds, ranked on their alpha t-statistic. For these funds, the simulated distri-
bution has thinner tails than the actual alpha t-statistics. This is because the actual performance
features ”shoulders” in these regions under the normality assumption. According to Kosowski
et al. (2006), the bootstrap inference does not only measure fat or thin tails of the actual distri-
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bution but also captures the complex shape of the entire distribution of t-statistics under the null
hypothesis.
As we can see from Figure 7, the distribution display somewhat thinner tails on the right
side of the distribution. As a result, the bootstrap approach as presented has a better explanatory
effect on the positive alpha t-statistics than the negative alpha t-statistics.
5.4 Methodology of Harvey & Liu (2020)
Until now, we have only considered the possibility of selecting a mutual fund manager that
turns out to be unskilled (Type I error). However, we have not considered the possibility of
missing a manager that turns out to be skilled (Type II error). The methodology of Harvey & Liu
(2020) consider this error rate that allows us to estimate the Test power. First, we will implement
their bootstrap methodology to estimate the cutoff t-statistic for various alternative hypotheses
to control for luck. Second, we use the double bootstrap approach that allows us to estimate the
Type II error rate, Oratio and calculate the Test power.
5.4.1 Cutoff t-statistics
In the first part, we estimate the cutoff t-statistic corresponding to a false discovery rate at 5%.
We operate under the null hypothesis of no true performance α = 0 for all funds and estimate the
cutoff for various alternative hypotheses HNA as presented in Table 1. The Type I error rate is as-
sociated with the FDR and will be the error rate we estimate in this test. Harvey & Liu (2020) ar-
gue that the cutoff t-statistic method is essential when assessing significance in the dataset. They
argue that a pre-defined cutoff t-statistic, commonly 2.0 or 3.0 from Harvey, Liu and Zhu (2016),
will be misguiding for the actual threshold of the sample. Using a hurdle of t-statistics from 1.5
to 4.0, we perform a reversed approach. The funds’ alpha t-statistic distribution determines the
cutoff of significance when controlling for a specific level of FDR, making the estimated cutoff
data-specific. The method of cutoff t-statistics for zero outperforming or underperforming funds
is aligned with Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama & French (1993). The method of Harvey & Liu
(2020), as described above, will provide aligned results as we will demonstrate.
We will examine both tails of the distribution to assess whether there exists skill among
managers, under the assumption of zero performance. In Appendix F, we estimate the FDR
for each alternative hypothesis HNA , in a cutoff sequence from 1.5 to 4.0 (or -4.0 to -1.5) by
0.1 increments. The cutoff t-statistic is defined for each hypothesis as the first observed cutoff
increment where FDR < 0.05. The cutoff t-statistics are closely similar for both positive and
negative cutoff t-statistics, as shown in Appendix F.
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Figure 8: Optimal cutoff t-statistic distribution
Figure 8 shows the simulated t-statistic of alphas for a selection of HA. It depicts the cutoff t-statistic
where we control for a 5 percent False Discovery Rate (FDR). The graphs on the left show distribution of
outperforming funds, and underperforming funds to the right.
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The first method serves to find the cutoff t-statistic for a given HA in the sample under the
null hypothesis of zero performance for all funds. From Figure 8 the distribution of t-statistics
for the respective alphas dependant upon the FDR is displayed for a selection of HA. As an
example from Figure 8 a), where H3A > 0, we test whether the three best funds display positive
alphas. Under this hypothesis, the optimal cutoff when controlling for a 5% false discovery rate
is found at 2.4. Thus, the cutoff t-statistic represents the level of t-statistic required to reject the
null hypothesis (H0).
Figure 9 presents the cutoff t-statistic as a function of HA, the number of funds we test to
be out-or underperforming, out of all mutual funds. The results in Figure 9 show that the cutoff
t-statistic decreases as more funds are believed to be outperforming. This result is, according to
Harvey & Liu (2020), because discovery is less likely to be false when a larger fraction of the data
is true. This corresponds to Figure 9 which shows that when we test for 1 fund outperforming,
the cutoff t-statistic is higher (2.9) than if a test for 2 funds outperforming (2.6).
Figure 9: Cutoff t-statistic as function of HA
The figure display the out- and underperforming cutoffs at first observed element of FDR < 0.05. It
illustrates the cutoffs differing on the different HA. The graph on the left display the development of
cutoffs for outperforming funds, and on the right, underperforming funds.
Through this method, we can test the null hypothesis of zero performance for all funds under
the assumption of different alternative hypotheses HA. Using the bootstrapped sample of the
funds’ return, we obtain a t-statistic threshold for different False Discovery Rate values (FDR).
The cutoff t-statistic for each hypothesis is compared to the generated alpha t-statistic for each
fund in the method of Kosowski et al. (2006). If any funds display a higher t-statistic of alpha
than the cutoff, H0 must be rejected as the assumption of zero funds outperforming cannot hold
true. As presented in the methodology, we will operate under the hypotheses as shown in Table 1
where we test for N = 10 funds assumed to have alpha values larger (α > 0) or smaller (α < 0)
than zero.
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Table 9 provides a summary of the overall results of our cutoff t-statistic analysis using the
dataset of all funds with α = 0. The table is divided into top and bottom performing funds;
Panel A presents the results from the analysis with the Top 10 performing funds, ranked by alpha
t-statistic from the procedure of Kosowski et al. (2006). Panel B displays the same results for
the 10 bottom-performing funds. The table display statistical results regarding the individual
fund’s t-statistic of alpha, the cutoff t-statistic for a given alternative hypothesis and whether the
null hypothesis can be rejected for the HA in question. From Table 9 for H0A, we can see the
cutoff t-statistic, at 3.8, being much higher than any fund’s alpha t-statistic from the procedure
of Kosowski et al. (2006), which implies that the assumption of zero outperforming funds may,
or may not be true, as there is no suitable significance in the sample. Thus, we cannot reject the
H0 of zero funds outperforming. Next, we will look at some examples from the table.
For H1A, the estimated cutoff t-statistic is 2.9. For the H0 to be rejected, there needs to be
one fund displaying a t-statistic of alpha higher than the cutoff. The best performing fund’s t-
statistic of alpha is 2.23, and we see that no fund beats the threshold, and thus the H0 cannot be
rejected. For H5A, the cutoff is 2.1, and to reject the H0, at least 5 funds must display a higher
alpha t-statistic than the cutoff. The fifth best fund displays a 1.94 alpha t-statistic, and since the
table is ranked, we can still not reject the H0 of no funds outperforming. These two examples
are representative of all the top funds in our analysis. For all p0, the H0 can not be rejected, and
we fail to find evidence towards skillful managers in the sample with statistical significance.
The tendency towards more funds being statistically significant in underperformance due to a
lack of stock-picking skill is apparent. We see that H0A for underperforming funds does not pro-
vide any funds with a lower alpha t-statistic, so we cannot rejectH0. However, forH1A, the cutoff
t-statistic is at -2.6. Therefore, to reject the H0, we must identify at least one fund with a lower
alpha t-statistic. We see that the worst-performing fund displays an alpha t-statistic of -3.22, be-
ing above the threshold. Thus, we can reject H0 of no funds underperforming and accept the H1A
of at least one fund underperforming. For H7A, the cutoff is -1.8, and we must identify at least 7
funds with an alpha t-statistic below this cutoff. The seventh worst performing fund displays an
alpha t-statistic of -2.03, and we can reject H0 of no funds underperforming, accepting the H7A
of at least seven funds underperforming. All alternative hypotheses for underperforming funds
are accepted as we consistently identify that funds display alpha t-statistic below the cutoff.
For Table 9, we return to finding a lack of statistical significance in locating outperforming
funds. We can not reject H0 for any HA and can not, with any statistical certainty, find evidence
towards any funds outperforming due to skillful managers. For the underperforming funds, we
identify significance alpha t-statistics, being able to rejectH0 for everyHA tested for. The results
show us that we can not identify any outperforming funds explained by skill. Furthermore, that
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bad performing funds are underperforming due to a lack of skill by using the cutoff t-statistic
presented by Harvey & Liu (2020).
Table 9: Cutoff t-statistic test results
The table displays the summary of cutoff t-statistics on a range of HA. Through the cutoff t-statistic, we
measure each hypothesis towards the ranked t-statistic of each fund’s alpha and thus determine whether
the H0 is rejected or not. The table also displays the number of observations with a t-statistic higher than
the cutoff t-statistic of a particular p0.
αt Cutoff t-stat HA H0 reject?
HA Panel A: Top 10 funds
0 Zero funds outperform 3.8 α > 0 No
1 Danske Invest Norge Aksj. Inst 1 2.23 2.9 α1 > 0 No
2 FIRST Norge Fokus 2.19 2.6 α1,2 > 0 No
3 Landkreditt Utbytte 2.15 2.4 α1,2,3 > 0 No
4 Fondsfinans Norge 1.94 2.2 α1,2,..,4 > 0 No
5 Danske Invest Norge Aksj. Inst 2 1.94 2.1 α1,2,..,5 > 0 No
6 PLUSS Markedsverdi (Fondsforv) 1.83 2.0 α1,2,..,6 > 0 No
7 Landkreditt Utbytte I 1.82 1.9 α1,2,..,7 > 0 No
8 FORTE Trønder 1.43 1.8 α1,2,..,8 > 0 No
9 Storebrand Norge I 1.36 1.7 α1,2,..,9 > 0 No
10 Storebrand Norge Fossilfri 1.24 1.6 α1,2,..,10 > 0 No
Panel B: Bottom 10 funds
10 GAMBAK Oppkjøp -1.81 -1.6 α1,2,..,10 < 0 Yes
9 Danske Invest Aktiv Formuesf. A -1.89 -1.7 α1,2,..,9 < 0 Yes
8 Globus Norge -1.99 -1.7 α1,2,..,8 < 0 Yes
7 Alfred Berg Aksjef Norge -2.03 -1.8 α1,2,..,7 < 0 Yes
6 Alfred Berg Aksjespar -2.14 -1.9 α1,2,..,6 < 0 Yes
5 GJENSIDIGE AksjeSpar -2.45 -2.0 α1,2,..,5 < 0 Yes
4 Nordea SMB -2.63 -2.1 α1,2,..,4 < 0 Yes
3 GJENSIDIGE Invest -2.96 -2.2 α1,2,3 < 0 Yes
2 Nordea SMB II -3.18 -2.4 α1,2 < 0 Yes
1 Skandia SMB Norge -3.22 -2.6 α1 < 0 Yes
0 Zero fund under-perform -3.9 α < 0 No
45
5.4.2 Type II error rate and Test power
In the previous tests, we worked under the assumption of zero performance for all the managers
and tested this null hypothesis. However, these methods only allow us to evaluate the Type I
error rate. This section extends our analysis, assuming that a fraction of managers outperforms
or under-perform, that H0 : α 6= 0. Harvey & Liu (2020) present a double bootstrap procedure
under this null hypothesis, allowing us to estimate the Type II error rate. As mentioned in the
methodology section, we use the standard approach to estimate the Type II error to calculate the
Test power as well.
Figure 10 displays the distribution of alpha t-statistics of our sample and the receiving oper-
ating curve (ROC). We will evaluate the Test power of both tails. We can see that the distribution
of alpha t-statistics is skewed to the left, contributing to our previous findings that there is more
evidence towards lack of skill among underperforming managers than skill among outperforming
managers. There are some managers with alpha t-statistics between 1.5 and 4.0 in the distribu-
tion, which we want to investigate further. The ROC represents the relationship between the true
positive rate and the false positive rate. We can estimate these error rates for a given p0 in the
double bootstrap procedure and simulate it many more times to find the average across all the










to estimate the true positive rate and false-positive rate. Where n represents all the mutual funds
and j is the bootstrap iterations. The ideal classification outcome for TPR and FPR is given by
the point (0.1) where we have a false positive rate equal to zero and a true positive rate of 100%.
This result indicates that a curve closer to this point is deemed better than a curve close to the
random classification line. Figure 10 b) displays that the assumption on p0 = 10 is better than
p0 = 20. This result can be explained by the fact that a smaller p0 results in a higher average
t-statistic.
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Figure 10: Mutual fund performance
These figures display the graphical representation of the Norwegian mutual fund’s performance with dif-
ferent descriptive statistics. Figure a) display the distribution of all funds’ alpha t-statistics from the
Kosowski et al. (2006) method computed from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model and show all 107
funds’ t-statistic of alpha. Figure b) is the Receiver Operating Characteristics for all funds from the Har-
vey & Liu (2020) double bootstrap method for error rate computation. It depicts the relationship between
the number of true positives and false positives for p0 = 10 and p0 = 20, as well as the 45-degree line of
random classification.
(a) t-stat distribution (b) Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC)
We first had to determine a threshold for performance evaluation that produces a specific false
discovery rate to analyze the error rates. As Harvey & Liu (2020), we control at a 5 percent False
Discovery Rate in our analyses of the cutoff t-statistics. Next, we create a vector of parameters
for the Type II error rate to correspond to the alternative hypotheses currently in testing. These
parameters are denoted as p0, and the vector contains values of 0, 5, 10 and 20. The parameter
p0 represent the fraction of managers initially assumed to have skill. In turn, the assumption of
p0 managers having skill implies that 1 − p0 of managers does not have skill. By adjusting the
sample regarding these assumptions, we create a matrix, where we define p0 of funds to have
the skill and contain their respective alpha-values. The remaining sample, 1− p0, is assumed to
have no skill, and thus the alpha-values of these funds are set to zero, implying that their return is
fully explained by the factors of the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. We will also assume that
a fraction of managers are unskilled, implying that p0 is unskilled. Thus, we range the matrix
with the p0 worst funds containing their alpha to test the absence of skill.
Calculation of error rates Type I, Type II, and the Oratio is described in detail in Section
3.3.2. We receive a distribution dependant upon the cutoff t-statistic for each p0; 5, 10 and 20
out- and underperforming funds through the formulas and the computation of the error rates.
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These results are displayed in Figure 11 and in Appendix B. We will now work with a new set of
hypotheses to fit the new performance evaluation methodology as described in Section 3.3.2.
Figure 11: Error rates for fixed t-statistic thresholds
The figure shows the simulated distribution of error rates for values of p0 = 5, 10, 20 out- and underper-
forming funds. The graphs display the development of Type I and Type II error rates and Oratio, varying
on the cutoff t-statistic increments. The figures are simulated from 107 fund’s excess return and boot-
strapped 1000x100 times. The red line represents the Type I error rate, the blue line represents the Type II
error rate, and the black dotted line represents Oratio. The left axis is the error rate of Type I and II. The
right axis is the Oratio values. The x-axis is the optimal cutoff t-statistics increment from (1.5 to 4.0) or
(-4.0 to -1.5).
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In Figure 11, for all p0, we see that the Type I error rate is declining when the cutoff t-statistic
increases and the Type II error rate increases. In this demonstration, we present the Type II error
rate that is proposed by Harvey & Liu (2020), not the standard approach. Type I error rate is high
when p0 = 5, starting at 0.6 at the 1.5 cutoff t-statistic, while Type II is at its lowest, starting
at 0.006. The error rates have a clear tendency towards a tradeoff. With an increase in cutoff
t-statistic, we see the error rates trade off on one another. The Oratio represents this relationship
drawing a curve closely following the Type I error rate but still affected downwards by the Type
II error rate. The higher the demand of the t-statistical cutoff, the lower the possibility of per-
forming a Type I error rate. This is mainly because high alpha t-statistics provide less chance
of identifying false positives out of the number of true positives. Type II error rate increases
as we increase the demand for t-statistics. The higher the demand, the more likely to define a
manager as unskillful when he is not. We see this more clearly when increasing p0 to 20. The
tradeoff is more apparent as the Type II ratio relative to Type I increases for all t-statistics. When
we assume more skilled managers, the possibility of rejecting a true positive increase, while the
ratio for accepting false positives decreases. Due to the cutoff analysis, the procedure is robust as
it considers which cutoff values for these funds correspond to the 5% false discovery rate. As we
increase our prior on p0, the error rates differ from the lower priors on p0, as should be expected.
Figure 12: Optimal error rate cutoff t-statistics
The figures display optimal error rate cutoffs for various p0 for the Type I and Oratio. Figure a) display
the optimal cutoff computed by controlling for 5 percent FDR from the thresholds distribution in Figure
11 and Table 11. Figure b) displays the optimal t-statistical cutoff for the Oratio while controlling for the
relationship between Type I and Type II at 0.1, when controlling for the assumption of Type I being ten
times as costly as Type II.
(a) Type I (b) Oratio
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If an investor would evaluate performance based upon the framework presented, we provide
a measurement tool through Oratio. Figure 11 and Appendix B or C may be used as a function
of cost for a potential investor. Suppose the investor believes that a false positive is ten times
more costly than a false negative. The investor could use Appendix B or C, and use 1/10 as a
benchmark for the Oratio, weighting the error rates according to cost, and thus determine optimal
cutoff t-statistic for his specific cost assessment. Figure 12 display the optimal cutoff t-statistic
for various HA. Figure a) display the cutoff t-statistic when controlling for 5% Type I error rate.
Figure b) display the cutoff t-statistic when Oratio is 0.1, as illustrated in the example above.
Table 10: Double bootstrap results
The table displays the summary of optimal cutoffs on a range of p0 from the results of the second bootstrap
of Harvey & Liu (2020). It displays the new optimal cutoff t-statistics for the p0. By using the optimal
cutoff as a reference, it is measured towards the ranked t-statistic of each funds alpha, and thus determine
whether the H0 is rejected or not. Table 10 further display the number of observations with a t-statistic,
higher for outperforming or lower for underperforming, than the respective cutoff of the particular p0, or
H0 in question.
p0 0 5 10 20
Outperforming funds
Optimal cutoff 4.0< 3.3 3.2 3.0
No. of funds outperf. 0 0 0 0
H0 rejected? No Yes Yes Yes
Test power (1-Type II) 0 55.8% 58.1% 68.1%
Underperforming funds
Optimal cutoff -4.0> -3.2 -3.0 -2.8
No. of funds underperf. 0 1 2 3
H0 rejected? Yes No No No
Test power (1-Type II) 0 74.6% 79.6% 83,4%
Table 10 displays whether there exists skill among mutual funds with the assumption that a
fraction of managers have are outperforming or underperforming. We find the optimal cutoff for
a 5 percent Type I error rate that we further use to estimate the Type II error. In this section, we
use the standard approach to estimate Type II errors, not the method suggested by Harvey & Liu
(2020). We change to S-Type II error rate as the standard approach allow us to calculate the Test
power. We can reject the null hypothesis if none of the funds exhibit a higher t-statistic than the
cutoff value, indicating no skillful managers. If any funds exhibit an alpha t-statistic higher than
the cutoff, this implies that we do not reject the null hypothesis and proceed to the alternative
hypothesis. If the test has a low Type II error (false negative), the Test power is high, indicating
that we have a majority of true positives. There is no formal significance standard for Test power
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to be adequate. However, an 80% Test power should be sufficient to say, with certainty, that there
exists outperforming or underperforming managers as a result of skill or lack thereof.
From Table 10, we further aim to locate whether or not our assumptions on p0 out- or under-
performing funds are true or not. The table display the results for p0 = 0, 5, 10, 20. The cutoff
t-statistic is higher for p0 in the second bootstrap than in the first bootstrap, as seen in Section
5.4.1 - Cutoff t-statistics. The number of observed funds above the optimal cutoff t-statistic by
controlling for FDR = 0.05 is zero for all observations for outperforming funds. We reject
the H0 for every p0, and we thus conclude that p0 = 5, 10, 20 number of funds are not outper-
forming their benchmark with statistical significance as a result of skill. However, the Type II
error rates display the ratio of misses in the sample. For higher values of p0, the ratio decreases.
The error rates is presented in Appendix B and C. In essence, we can say that by controlling
for 0.05 FDR, with a cutoff of 3.0 with the assumption of 20 outperforming funds, the rate of
missed outperforming managers are 0.319. We receive a Test power of 68.1%. A Test power
of 80% (probability of Type II = 20%) is necessary to ensure the probability of the error rate is
sufficiently low in the test. Even though we reject H0 with a Test power of 68.1%, we cannot
find skillful managers. However, we cannot say for certain that no skillful managers exist in our
sample. We illustrate how the error rates are estimated for p0 = 20 in Figure 13.
For the underperforming funds, we receive different results. By analyzing the cutoff for dif-
ferent p0, we identify some funds conveying a t-statistic lower than the negative cutoff threshold.
The result implies that we are not able to reject H0. For p0 = 5, we locate one underperforming
fund with statistical significance. For p0 = 10 we have two funds and for p0 = 20, we have three
funds. The discovery of funds with higher t-statistics than the thresholds tells us that the H0 can
not be rejected as presented above. This result further indicates that there is a possibility that
there, in fact, exists underperforming funds. However, we cannot reject the H0. We also see that
the Type II ratio decreases for an increasing number of p0, implying that the Type II error prob-
ability decreases, and we receive a higher Test power. The Test power when assuming p0 = 20
is above the required threshold of 80% (83.4%). Moreover, we can conclude with high certainty
that underperforming Norwegian mutual fund managers exist due to an absence of skills.
We will now illustrate how optimal cutoff for Oratio will affect our test of the null hypothesis.
Harvey & Liu (2020) suggests several advantages towards the use of Oratio as it quantifies the
chance of a false discovery per miss. In our example, we illustrate the Oratio when we suppose
that the cost of a Type I error is ten times that of a Type II error. We can use Appendix B to
control for the first cutoff value below 0.1. As we illustrated in Figure 12, the optimal cutoff for
Oratio is not very different from Type I under the assumption of outperforming managers. How-
ever, when we test the null hypotheses using the cutoff t-statistic for Oratio for underperforming
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managers from Appendix C, we get another slightly different result. For p0 = 10 there are two
underperforming funds and for p0 = 20 we identify four underperforming funds. However, the
main conclusion remains the same.
Figure 13 illustrate the error rates under the assumption of p0 = 20 managers are outperform-
ing. The blue distribution is where the density of t-statistics under the assumption of α 6= 0 and
the black distribution is under the density of t-statistics under the assumption that α = 0. In this
case, we do not observe any t-statistics above the cutoff threshold, indicating that we reject the
null hypothesis. However, there is a large possibility of Type II error (red area), that we miss a
manager we taught was unskilled. We cannot, with certainty, say that skillful managers do not
exist in our sample.
Figure 13: Error rate illustration
The figure displays the double bootstrapped results under the assumption of zero performance to the left
(black distribution) and under the assumption that p0 managers have skills. The bold line present the cutoff
t-statistic, the marked red area is the probability of Type II error, the marked black area is the probability
of a Type I error, and the marked blue area is the Test power. The illustration is presented under the
assumption of p0 = 20 with an FDR = 5%
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6 Conclusion
Our thesis evaluate the performance of mutual fund managers using data from 1987 to 2019 on
107 Norwegian mutual funds. The primary performance model we use in our tests is the Carhart
(1997) four-factor model. First, we test managers’ performance on an aggregate level. The result
indicates that the mutual fund managers produce a nonsignificant alpha at 0.035, suggesting that
the managers cannot beat the benchmark beyond their management cost on an aggregate level.
Second, we employ the individual standard test to find the actual performance of each manager
and their parametric p-value. The generated alpha values imply that some managers can beat the
benchmark beyond their fees and that some fail to beat the benchmark.
Further, we use a bootstrap approach to distinguish if the generated alpha results from luck or
skill. We follow a similar approach to Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama & French (2010) to test
the null hypothesis of zero performance for all funds, both individually and jointly. Through the
bootstrapped p-value, we fail to identify skill among the best performing funds, as we identify
that their performance results from luck rather than skill. However, for the worst-performing
funds, we reject the null hypothesis. We identify significant bootstrap p-values that indicate that
their returns result from bad performances rather than unlucky performances.
To present novelty to the subject, we implement the double bootstrap procedure similar to
Harvey & Liu (2020). This procedure allowed us to estimate the Type II error under the null hy-
pothesis that a fraction of managers outperform. We follow their procedure to estimate the cutoff
t-statistic by controlling for a certain level of Type I error rate in order to characterize the Type II
error rate. We find no statistically significant evidence that skillful managers exist. We reject the
null hypothesis: a specific fraction of managers outperform. However, our estimated Test power
of 50% indicates that there could be skilled outperforming managers, though we cannot detect
these. When we test the null hypothesis that a fraction of managers is underperforming, we fail
to reject the null hypothesis. We find statistically significant evidence that some managers of
Norwegian mutual funds display a lack of skill.
To summarize, we find significant evidence that there exist unskilled managers. We also find
that some Norwegian mutual fund managers generate positive abnormal returns, but these returns
result from luck. However, the estimated Test power indicates that some skillful managers might
exist, but our tests are not powerful enough to detect them.
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Appendix A: Historical risk free rate development
The figure displays the monthly development of the Norwegian risk free rate (NIBOR) for the full sample
period from 1987 to 2019.
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Appendix B: Error rates for fixed t-statistics for outperforming
funds
The table present the findings of the Harvey & Liu (2020) double bootstrap method with the estimation
of Type I, Type II and Oratio for outperforming funds in our sample of Norwegian mutual funds. The left
side of the table represent the hurdle of t-statistic cutoffs ranging from 1.5 to 4.0. The first row represent
the different priors on p0 in the analyses: 0, 5, 10 and 20 funds outperforming, respectively. The numbers
displayed in the table represent the rate of errors for a given prior on p0 and a given cutoff t-statistic from
the double bootstrapped sample of fund returns.
t-stat Type I Type II Oratio
0 5 10 20 5 10 20 5 10 20
1,5 1.000 0.599 0.443 0.311 0.061 0.063 0.045 2.730 3.520 1.042
1,6 1.000 0.555 0.404 0.282 0.072 0.073 0.054 2.458 2.788 0.777
1,7 1.000 0.510 0.366 0.254 0.085 0.085 0.065 2.194 2.198 0.578
1,8 0.999 0.466 0.329 0.228 0.099 0.097 0.076 1.907 1.667 0.432
1,9 0.997 0.420 0.292 0.202 0.112 0.112 0.089 1.631 1.254 0.321
2,0 0.993 0.374 0.258 0.179 0.128 0.130 0.103 1.381 0.935 0.241
2,1 0.987 0.330 0.227 0.158 0.146 0.149 0.119 1.127 0.686 0.181
2,2 0.976 0.288 0.198 0.139 0.165 0.170 0.137 0.910 0.501 0.136
2,3 0.958 0.251 0.171 0.121 0.184 0.189 0.154 0.734 0.365 0.102
2,4 0.938 0.217 0.148 0.106 0.203 0.209 0.174 0.585 0.265 0.077
2,5 0.912 0.184 0.127 0.092 0.227 0.233 0.194 0.449 0.190 0.057
2,6 0.879 0.157 0.109 0.080 0.252 0.258 0.219 0.345 0.137 0.043
2,7 0.844 0.132 0.093 0.070 0.275 0.282 0.242 0.262 0.101 0.033
2,8 0.809 0.111 0.080 0.061 0.297 0.305 0.267 0.196 0.074 0.025
2,9 0.774 0.094 0.069 0.053 0.327 0.332 0.292 0.148 0.054 0.019
3,0 0.732 0.080 0.060 0.046 0.355 0.362 0.319 0.112 0.041 0.014
3,1 0.692 0.067 0.052 0.039 0.380 0.391 0.345 0.082 0.030 0.011
3,2 0.654 0.057 0.044 0.034 0.411 0.419 0.371 0.062 0.023 0.008
3,3 0.618 0.050 0.039 0.030 0.442 0.447 0.401 0.048 0.018 0.006
3,4 0.582 0.042 0.034 0.027 0.470 0.474 0.427 0.036 0.013 0.005
3,5 0.547 0.036 0.030 0.024 0.496 0.502 0.455 0.028 0.011 0.004
3,6 0.510 0.030 0.027 0.022 0.521 0.529 0.481 0.022 0.008 0.003
3,7 0.478 0.027 0.024 0.018 0.551 0.557 0.509 0.017 0.007 0.003
3,8 0.446 0.024 0.021 0.016 0.580 0.582 0.532 0.013 0.005 0.002
3,9 0.416 0.022 0.018 0.015 0.607 0.608 0.559 0.011 0.004 0.002
4,0 0.384 0.020 0.015 0.014 0.633 0.634 0.585 0.009 0.003 0.002
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Appendix C: Error rates for fixed t-statistics for underperfom-
ing funds
The table present the findings of the Harvey & Liu (2020) double bootstrap method with the estimation of
Type I, Type II and Oratio for underperforming funds in our sample of Norwegian mutual funds. The left
side of the table represent the hurdle of t-statistic cutoffs ranging from -4.0 to -1.5. The first row represent
the different priors on p0 in the analyses: 5, 10 and 20 funds underperforming, respectively. The numbers
displayed in the table represent the rate of errors for a given prior on p0 and a given cutoff t-statistic from
the double bootstrapped sample of fund returns.
t-stat Type I Type II Oratio
0 5 10 20 5 10 20 5 10 20
-4,0 0.013 0.010 0.008 0.458 0.442 0.444 0.010 0.004 0.002
-3,9 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.429 0.417 0.415 0.014 0.005 0.002
-3,8 0.017 0.013 0.011 0.404 0.390 0.386 0.018 0.006 0.003
-3,7 0.020 0.015 0.012 0.377 0.362 0.360 0.023 0.008 0.003
-3,6 0.024 0.018 0.013 0.352 0.335 0.334 0.032 0.011 0.004
-3,5 0.028 0.021 0.016 0.326 0.312 0.309 0.041 0.015 0.005
-3,4 0.034 0.025 0.018 0.301 0.287 0.285 0.054 0.020 0.006
-3,3 0.040 0.029 0.021 0.277 0.263 0.262 0.071 0.027 0.009
-3,2 0.049 0.034 0.024 0.254 0.243 0.238 0.093 0.036 0.011
-3,1 0.058 0.039 0.028 0.235 0.223 0.218 0.120 0.049 0.015
-3,0 0.070 0.045 0.032 0.213 0.204 0.201 0.156 0.067 0.020
-2,9 0.083 0.054 0.037 0.196 0.187 0.183 0.199 0.094 0.027
-2,8 0.099 0.064 0.043 0.180 0.170 0.166 0.259 0.127 0.035
-2,7 0.119 0.075 0.051 0.164 0.154 0.150 0.324 0.173 0.047
-2,6 0.142 0.088 0.059 0.148 0.141 0.137 0.407 0.236 0.064
-2,5 0.170 0.106 0.069 0.136 0.125 0.126 0.507 0.327 0.086
-2,4 0.202 0.125 0.081 0.123 0.112 0.115 0.628 0.444 0.117
-2,3 0.236 0.147 0.094 0.111 0.102 0.106 0.760 0.599 0.159
-2,2 0.275 0.173 0.110 0.099 0.093 0.098 0.904 0.799 0.217
-2,1 0.317 0.202 0.128 0.089 0.084 0.090 1.066 1.049 0.298
-2,0 0.362 0.233 0.147 0.081 0.075 0.082 1.235 1.345 0.407
-1,9 0.409 0.267 0.169 0.074 0.068 0.074 1.416 1.692 0.558
-1,8 0.457 0.304 0.193 0.066 0.060 0.065 1.597 2.092 0.768
-1,7 0.505 0.343 0.220 0.060 0.054 0.059 1.775 2.548 1.057
-1,6 0.552 0.383 0.248 0.054 0.048 0.054 1.947 3.023 1.442
-1,5 0.596 0.424 0.278 0.049 0.042 0.048 2.118 3.515 1.939
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Appendix D: Descriptive statistics Norwegian mutual fund
1
Name Obs Mean Std.dev Kurt Skew Max Min
ABIF Norge ++ 56.00 0.01 0.07 -0.47 -0.31 0.14 -0.16
Alfred Berg Aksjef Norge 115.00 0.01 0.06 1.88 -0.77 0.13 -0.25
Alfred Berg Aksjespar 106.00 0.01 0.07 2.17 -0.87 0.13 -0.28
Alfred Berg Aktiv 289.00 0.01 0.07 2.59 -0.77 0.21 -0.27
Alfred Berg Aktiv II 182.00 0.01 0.07 1.23 -0.60 0.18 -0.27
Alfred Berg Gambak 350.00 0.01 0.07 2.69 -0.40 0.28 -0.27
Alfred Berg Humanfond 241.00 0.01 0.06 3.04 -0.97 0.16 -0.26
Alfred Berg N. Pensjon 52.00 0.01 0.06 4.56 -1.36 0.12 -0.25
Alfred Berg Norge 147.00 0.01 0.07 1.90 -0.96 0.17 -0.27
Alfred Berg Norge gml 197.00 0.01 0.07 2.23 -0.97 0.17 -0.27
Alfred Berg Norge Classic 351.00 0.01 0.06 3.04 -1.06 0.17 -0.27
Alfred Berg Norge Etisk 146.00 0.01 0.07 2.58 -1.04 0.17 -0.28
Alfred Berg Norge Inst 72.00 0.01 0.03 1.26 -0.95 0.07 -0.08
Alfred Berg Vekst 72.00 0.01 0.08 1.89 -0.51 0.19 -0.28
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class A 109.00 0.01 0.03 1.51 -0.67 0.09 -0.09
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class B 110.00 0.01 0.03 1.44 -0.57 0.10 -0.09
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class D 83.00 0.01 0.03 1.55 -0.92 0.07 -0.09
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class I 110.00 0.01 0.03 1.41 -0.58 0.10 -0.09
Atlas Norge 263.00 0.01 0.07 3.67 -0.09 0.37 -0.25
Banco Norge 38.00 0.01 0.07 -0.27 -0.33 0.14 -0.17
C WorldWide Norge 294.00 0.01 0.06 3.07 -0.89 0.20 -0.28
Carnegie Aksje Norge 210.00 0.01 0.07 2.06 -0.86 0.20 -0.28
Danske Invest Aktiv Formuesf. A 21.00 0.01 0.04 0.59 -0.83 0.08 -0.11
Danske Invest Norge Aksj. Inst 1 237.00 0.01 0.06 2.69 -0.93 0.15 -0.23
Danske Invest Norge Aksj. Inst 2 158.00 0.01 0.05 4.29 -1.16 0.15 -0.23
Danske Invest Norge I 312.00 0.01 0.06 3.63 -1.03 0.15 -0.29
Danske Invest Norge II 312.00 0.01 0.06 3.64 -1.02 0.15 -0.29
Danske Invest Norge Vekst 312.00 0.01 0.06 6.61 0.33 0.42 -0.26
Delphi Norge 307.00 0.01 0.07 2.07 -0.54 0.23 -0.25
Delphi Vekst 193.00 0.01 0.08 1.03 -0.33 0.26 -0.23
DNB Norge 289.00 0.01 0.06 2.38 -0.84 0.16 -0.24
DNB Norge (Avanse I) 327.00 0.01 0.06 2.10 -0.96 0.16 -0.26
DNB Norge (Avanse II) 287.00 0.01 0.06 2.39 -0.96 0.16 -0.26
DNB Norge (I) 295.00 0.01 0.07 15.28 1.31 0.59 -0.24
DNB Norge (III) 283.00 0.01 0.06 2.37 -0.87 0.16 -0.24
DNB Norge (IV) 206.00 0.01 0.06 2.95 -0.89 0.16 -0.24
DNB Norge R 12.00 0.01 0.03 0.70 -1.20 0.04 -0.06
DNB Norge Selektiv (II) 214.00 0.01 0.06 2.37 -0.77 0.17 -0.24
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Table 11 – Continued from previous page
Name Obs Mean Std.dev Kurt Skew Max Min
DNB Norge Selektiv (III) 307.00 0.01 0.06 2.22 -0.82 0.17 -0.24
DnB Real-Vekst 157.00 0.01 0.09 24.68 2.15 0.69 -0.40
DNB SMB 226.00 0.01 0.07 1.17 -0.47 0.17 -0.26
Eika Norge 196.00 0.01 0.06 3.96 -1.02 0.18 -0.25
Eika SMB 187.00 0.01 0.07 1.28 -0.67 0.17 -0.23
FIRST Generator 112.00 0.01 0.06 1.41 -0.77 0.16 -0.19
FIRST Norge Fokus 14.00 0.01 0.03 0.70 -0.99 0.05 -0.06
Fokus Barnespar 32.00 -0.00 0.08 3.44 -1.21 0.13 -0.28
Fondsfinans Aktiv II 48.00 -0.00 0.07 -0.07 -0.23 0.14 -0.16
Fondsfinans Norge 205.00 0.01 0.06 2.66 -0.78 0.16 -0.26
FORTE Norge 107.00 0.01 0.04 1.05 -0.08 0.14 -0.12
FORTE Tr?nder 81.00 0.01 0.03 0.27 -0.14 0.09 -0.09
GAMBAK Oppkj?p 19.00 0.00 0.05 0.48 0.35 0.14 -0.09
GJENSIDIGE AksjeSpar 152.00 0.01 0.07 2.18 -0.94 0.17 -0.27
GJENSIDIGE Invest 104.00 0.01 0.06 2.39 -0.85 0.13 -0.21
Globus Aktiv 88.00 0.01 0.08 0.35 -0.30 0.24 -0.23
Globus Norge 103.00 0.01 0.08 0.38 -0.35 0.22 -0.23
Globus Norge II 95.00 0.01 0.08 0.40 -0.24 0.23 -0.23
Handelsbanken Norge 300.00 0.01 0.06 4.08 -1.17 0.18 -0.29
Handelsbanken Norge A10 18.00 0.00 0.04 0.52 -1.18 0.05 -0.09
Holberg Norge 229.00 0.01 0.06 1.70 -0.52 0.16 -0.24
K-IPA Aksjefond 37.00 0.01 0.07 2.08 -0.97 0.12 -0.22
KLP Aksjeinvest 97.00 0.00 0.06 1.67 -0.78 0.15 -0.22
KLP AksjeNorge 250.00 0.01 0.06 3.24 -0.91 0.18 -0.30
Landkreditt Norge 122.00 0.01 0.06 2.14 -0.74 0.17 -0.21
Landkreditt Utbytte 83.00 0.01 0.02 0.44 -0.76 0.05 -0.05
Landkreditt Utbytte I 19.00 0.01 0.02 -0.29 -0.39 0.04 -0.04
NB-Aksjefond 207.00 0.01 0.06 2.14 -0.94 0.18 -0.25
Nordea Avkastning 396.00 0.01 0.06 2.70 -0.87 0.21 -0.28
Nordea Barnespar 47.00 -0.00 0.06 -0.32 -0.36 0.11 -0.16
Nordea Kapital 298.00 0.01 0.06 2.92 -1.01 0.17 -0.26
Nordea Kapital II 84.00 0.01 0.07 -0.20 -0.47 0.13 -0.17
Nordea Kapital III 70.00 0.01 0.07 -0.25 -0.56 0.13 -0.17
Nordea Norge Pluss 105.00 0.01 0.04 1.17 -0.65 0.12 -0.11
Nordea Norge Verdi 287.00 0.01 0.05 2.66 -0.87 0.15 -0.24
Nordea SMB 213.00 0.01 0.07 0.54 -0.23 0.18 -0.23
Nordea SMB II 70.00 -0.01 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.19 -0.19
Nordea Vekst 337.00 0.01 0.07 1.85 -0.85 0.20 -0.26
ODIN Norge 331.00 0.01 0.06 2.42 -0.43 0.23 -0.24
ODIN Norge A 50.00 0.01 0.03 1.55 -1.19 0.05 -0.09
Continued on next page
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Name Obs Mean Std.dev Kurt Skew Max Min
ODIN Norge B 50.00 0.01 0.03 1.56 -1.20 0.05 -0.09
ODIN Norge D 50.00 0.01 0.03 1.56 -1.20 0.05 -0.09
ODIN Norge II 139.00 0.01 0.06 3.11 -0.99 0.14 -0.24
Orkla Finans 30 162.00 0.02 0.06 1.48 -0.71 0.15 -0.26
Pareto Aksje Norge 220.00 0.01 0.05 3.53 -0.84 0.16 -0.26
PLUSS Aksje (Fondsforval) 277.00 0.01 0.06 2.32 -0.72 0.18 -0.26
PLUSS Markedsverdi (Fondsforv) 300.00 0.01 0.06 3.21 -0.98 0.16 -0.25
Postbanken Aksjevekst 97.00 0.01 0.07 0.15 -0.40 0.15 -0.20
RF Aksjefond 116.00 0.01 0.06 1.27 -0.73 0.14 -0.24
RF-Plussfond 54.00 0.01 0.07 -0.53 -0.36 0.14 -0.17
Sbanken Framgang Sammen 47.00 0.01 0.03 0.81 -0.73 0.07 -0.07
SEB Norge LU 67.00 -0.00 0.07 1.24 -0.65 0.16 -0.26
Skandia Horisont 97.00 0.01 0.06 1.13 -0.76 0.16 -0.22
Skandia SMB Norge 97.00 0.00 0.07 2.44 -1.01 0.14 -0.27
SR-Bank Norge A 12.00 0.01 0.03 -0.50 -0.49 0.05 -0.05
SR-Bank Norge B 12.00 0.01 0.03 -0.50 -0.49 0.05 -0.05
Storebrand Aksje Innland 282.00 0.01 0.06 3.08 -1.02 0.15 -0.27
Storebrand AksjeSpar 226.00 0.01 0.04 1.30 -0.89 0.10 -0.14
Storebrand Norge 396.00 0.01 0.06 2.48 -0.89 0.17 -0.29
Storebrand Norge A 43.00 0.02 0.07 -0.24 -0.52 0.15 -0.17
Storebrand Norge Fossilfri 33.00 0.01 0.02 1.35 -0.89 0.05 -0.05
Storebrand Norge I 237.00 0.01 0.06 3.21 -1.00 0.15 -0.29
Storebrand Norge Institusjon 39.00 0.01 0.04 0.65 -0.53 0.10 -0.10
Storebrand Optima Norge 221.00 0.01 0.06 3.04 -0.99 0.15 -0.29
Storebrand Vekst 328.00 0.01 0.07 3.70 0.01 0.37 -0.30
Storebrand Verdi 265.00 0.01 0.06 3.18 -0.97 0.14 -0.27
Storebrand Verdi N 22.00 0.01 0.03 -0.15 -0.53 0.06 -0.06
Terra Norge 187.00 0.01 0.07 1.46 -0.75 0.19 -0.26
VAAR Aksjefond 39.00 0.01 0.07 3.49 -1.19 0.11 -0.26
1The table present discriptive statistics for all 107 mutual funds in our sample. The funds are ranked alphabeti-
cally. The descriptive statistics represent the following. Column 2 show the number of observations, e.g. the number
of months of historical data. Column 3 provide the excess return of the fund, net of management fees. Columns 4
till 8 show standard statistical measurements of the sample: standard deviation, kurtosis, skew, maximum observed
value and minimum observed value for each fund, respectively.
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Appendix E: Bootstrap results for individual mutual funds
2
Name Alpha t-stat alpha p-value boot p-value
Danske Invest Norge Aksj. Inst 1 3.02 2.23 0.01 0.80
FIRST Norge Fokus 10.95 2.19 0.01 0.50
Landkreditt Utbytte 5.38 2.15 0.02 0.35
Fondsfinans Norge 3.78 1.94 0.03 0.37
Danske Invest Norge Aksj. Inst 2 3.26 1.94 0.03 0.21
PLUSS Markedsverdi (Fondsforv) 1.95 1.83 0.03 0.21
Landkreditt Utbytte I 7.62 1.82 0.03 0.10
FORTE Trxb0nder 6.18 1.43 0.08 0.66
Storebrand Norge I 1.60 1.36 0.09 0.64
Storebrand Norge Fossilfri 4.18 1.24 0.11 0.78
Storebrand Optima Norge 1.72 1.19 0.12 0.77
Landkreditt Norge 3.19 1.15 0.12 0.69
Carnegie Aksje Norge 1.78 1.15 0.13 0.62
DNB Norge R 6.11 1.11 0.13 0.55
Danske Invest Norge II 1.39 1.07 0.14 0.60
Storebrand Verdi N 2.32 1.02 0.15 0.58
Storebrand Verdi 1.13 0.99 0.16 0.57
Eika Norge 1.71 0.97 0.17 0.54
Pareto Aksje Norge 1.80 0.95 0.17 0.43
K-IPA Aksjefond 4.72 0.90 0.18 0.50
Nordea Norge Verdi 1.35 0.88 0.19 0.45
Alfred Berg Norge 1.37 0.85 0.20 0.43
PLUSS Aksje (Fondsforval) 1.25 0.82 0.21 0.43
Nordea Kapital 0.93 0.81 0.21 0.40
Storebrand Norge 0.97 0.74 0.23 0.53
C WorldWide Norge 0.92 0.74 0.23 0.44
DNB SMB 1.91 0.71 0.24 0.44
Alfred Berg Norge Inst 1.30 0.66 0.26 0.54
Holberg Norge 1.15 0.59 0.28 0.61
ODIN Norge 1.07 0.55 0.29 0.65
Danske Invest Norge I 0.72 0.55 0.29 0.58
ODIN Norge A 1.55 0.54 0.29 0.52
DNB Norge Selektiv (II) 0.58 0.50 0.31 0.55
ODIN Norge D 1.31 0.45 0.32 0.59
ODIN Norge B 1.28 0.45 0.33 0.58
Vxc5R Aksjefond 1.91 0.42 0.34 0.58
Storebrand Aksje Innland 0.23 0.30 0.38 0.80
Nordea Avkastning 0.48 0.29 0.38 0.75
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Name Alpha t-stat alpha p-value boot p-value
ABIF Norge ++ 0.70 0.29 0.39 0.70
Alfred Berg Humanfond 0.31 0.21 0.42 0.82
DNB Norge (IV) 0.17 0.16 0.44 0.89
KLP AksjeNorge 0.21 0.15 0.44 0.90
Skandia Horisont 0.26 0.08 0.47 0.95
Handelsbanken Norge 0.08 0.06 0.48 0.96
Storebrand Vekst 0.06 0.02 0.49 0.96
Berg Norge gml -0.01 -0.01 0.50 0.03
DNB Norge (I) -0.19 -0.07 0.47 0.01
DNB Norge (III) -0.06 -0.07 0.47 0.03
Storebrand AksjeSpar -0.20 -0.10 0.46 0.02
Delphi Norge -0.23 -0.12 0.45 0.04
ODIN Norge II -0.39 -0.15 0.44 0.02
Alfre d Berg Gambak FORTE Norge -0.38 -0.19 0.42 0.02
Nordea Kapital II -0.71 -0.26 0.40 0.00
FORTE Norge -1.04 -0.33 0.37 0.00
Danske Invest Norge Vekst -0.74 -0.33 0.37 0.00
DnB Real-Vekst -2.30 -0.36 0.36 0.00
DNB Norge Selektiv (III) -0.38 -0.36 0.36 0.01
Nordea Norge Pluss -0.81 -0.38 0.35 0.03
Sbanken Framgang Sammen -1.01 -0.41 0.34 0.03
Banco Norge -2.11 -0.50 0.31 0.00
Eika SMB -1.23 -0.52 0.30 0.01
SEB Norge LU -1.68 -0.53 0.30 0.01
Storebrand Norge A -2.27 -0.56 0.29 0.01
Fondsfinans Aktiv II -2.49 -0.65 0.26 0.00
Alfred Berg Norge Etisk -1.23 -0.68 0.25 0.00
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class D -1.54 -0.69 0.25 0.00
Terra Norge -1.28 -0.69 0.24 0.01
Delphi Vekst -1.99 -0.74 0.23 0.00
DNB Norge (Avanse I) -1.00 -0.80 0.21 0.00
Handelsbanken Norge A10 -3.21 -0.84 0.20 0.00
NB-Aksjefond -1.36 -0.85 0.20 0.00
Atlas Norge -1.91 -0.91 0.18 0.00
FIRST Generator -3.58 -0.91 0.18 0.00
Alfred Berg Aktiv -1.71 -0.92 0.18 0.00
Alfred Berg Norge Classic -0.94 -0.93 0.18 0.00
Nordea Barnespar -3.02 -0.94 0.17 0.00
KLP Aksjeinvest -2.44 -0.97 0.17 0.00
SR-Bank Norge B -7.07 -1.05 0.15 0.00
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Name Alpha t-stat alpha p-value boot p-value
SR-Bank Norge A -7.08 -1.05 0.15 0.00
Orkla Finans 30 -2.07 -1.06 0.14 0.02
RF Aksjefond -2.32 -1.09 0.14 0.02
Postbanken Aksjevekst -2.97 -1.17 0.12 0.01
Alfred Berg Aktiv II -2.93 -1.20 0.12 0.02
Globus Aktiv -6.13 -1.21 0.11 0.02
Nordea Kapital III -3.23 -1.24 0.11 0.02
Alfred Berg N. Pensjon -3.49 -1.24 0.11 0.03
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class A -2.92 -1.30 0.10 0.01
Nordea Vekst -1.77 -1.31 0.10 0.02
Storebrand Norge Institusjon -3.56 -1.33 0.09 0.02
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class I -2.86 -1.37 0.09 0.03
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class B -2.99 -1.42 0.08 0.02
Plussfond -7.01 -1.43 0.08 0.02
DNB Norge -1.21 -1.44 0.07 0.04
DNB Norge (Avanse II) -1.72 -1.53 0.06 0.00
Fokus Barnespar -11.89 -1.67 0.05 0.00
Alfred Berg Vekst -8.95 -1.72 0.04 0.00
Globus Norge II -8.34 -1.73 0.04 0.00
GAMBAK Oppkjxf8p -18.62 -1.81 0.04 0.00
Danske Invest Aktiv Formuesf. A -19.06 -1.89 0.03 0.00
Globus Norge -8.54 -1.99 0.02 0.00
Alfred Berg Aksjef Norge -3.32 -2.03 0.02 0.01
Alfred Berg Aksjespar -4.98 -2.14 0.01 0.02
GJENSIDIGE AksjeSpar -4.28 -2.45 0.00 0.00
Nordea SMB -6.44 -2.63 0.00 0.00
GJENSIDIGE Invest -5.31 -2.96 0.00 0.00
Nordea SMB II -16.93 -3.18 0.00 0.01
Skandia SMB Norge -12.25 -3.22 0.00 0.10
2The table reports the bootstrapped results for each of the 107 funds in our sample. The funds are sorted by their
alpha t-statistic. Column 2-5 reports the alpha, alpha t-statistic, parametric p-value and bootstrapped p-value. The






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix G: Discussion paper - Jonas Driveklepp
Master’s thesis 2021 - Discussion paper on the topic of Responsibility
The following discussion paper is based upon the master’s thesis: ”A performance evaluation
of Norwegian mutual funds: Luck versus Skill”. The main focus of our thesis is the performance
of mutual fund managers in the Norwegian mutual fund market. We perform a series of tests to
estimate whether we can identify any funds outperforming or underperforming their respective
benchmarks. Further, we use statistical measures to determine whether the past performance of
mutual fund managers originates from stock-picking skills or if it originates from luck, and in
many cases, persistent luck. The analysis was performed for underperforming funds, whether it
was lack of skill or simply bad luck among the managers of these funds. Thirdly, we analyze the
error rates in multiple testing to create the possibility for investors to weigh their assessed cost
of risk upon our analysis. Our thesis executes several statistical testing procedures upon the Nor-
wegian mutual fund market, and some of the methods used have never before been performed
onto the Norwegian market. Thus, our thesis presents novelty to the existing literature.
Responsibility in our thesis plays an important role in some of the different aspects of our
thesis. I will divide the discussion into two subsections; 1) Actively managed funds 2) Statistical
research.
Actively managed funds
The financial sector has experienced a severe increase in legislated responsibility towards its
consumers over the last two decades. From the Financial crisis in 2008, the world’s governments
saw the necessity of regulations in the, up and till now, free market of immensely powerful
actors (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, 2009). The financial crisis of 2008 originated
from several factors, one of them being the lack of transparency and the enormous complexity
of the products offered to consumers. Mortgage bonds were one of these products (Acharya &
Richardson, 2009). In essence, this was a financial product offered by banks where consumers
could purchase a stake, or in many ways a bet, of a group of mortgages and their payments. The
assumption being that everyone always paid their mortgages. In essence, the product was labeled
as close to risk-free. The labeling of such products shows the lack of transparency towards the
consumers in such financial instruments. Actively managed mutual funds are similar to these
instruments. These funds proclaim that an investor’s keen-eyed instincts and immense resources
will have the capacity to beat the market for an extra cost of management fees. These fees are
typically around 1.5% - 3.0% for actively managed Norwegian mutual funds. One of the primary
responsibilities of the banks is to present these products as they are, with their inherent risk, the
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possibility of underperformance and the alleged certainty of outperformance of the market – to
make up for the management costs. The alternative to an actively managed fund is a passively
managed fund. These funds are algorithmically managed, continuously assessing the overall
market and aiming to match the benchmark. The benchmark in our thesis on the Norwegian
Mutual funds market is the OSEAX, Oslo All Share Index. This index reflects all stock on the
Oslo Stock exchange and weights the index according to the stock’s market capitalization size.
Since the introduction of securities trade, there have been increased speculations; Do actively
managed funds outperform their passive, less costly counterpart, and do they outperform them
in such effect that the management costs incur excess return. This statement is the basis of
one of our research questions. Through our analyses, and many studies before us, we come to
the same conclusion; Actively managed funds do not beat their benchmark in excess of their
respective management fees persistently. This result originates from several articles, Martin J.
Gruber (1996), Lars Q. Sørensen (2011) and Harvey & Liu (2020), to mention a few. However,
some funds do outperform in the short run, but these results are a product of luck instead of skill.
Numerous articles, studies and papers have come to the same conclusion, but the amount invested
in actively managed funds keeps increasing yearly. This discovery begs the question; Do the
financial services providers and the banks present all available information to their customers?
There seems to be an indication of a lack of transparency as scientific results differ from the
actual development in the market.
Our thesis does not focus directly upon the banks’ advisory strategies, nor have we assessed
the specific development in the acquisition of actively managed Norwegian mutual funds. We
have analyzed the historical returns in the market objectively and scientifically. We have identi-
fied evidence that an actively managed mutual fund bears a high risk for underperformance and
low to non-existing possibilities of outperformance. With the increased cost of management,
there seems to be little scientific evidence that consumers should choose such products. We be-
lieve this topic sheds light upon the stakeholders’ responsibility and actors in the financial mar-
ket, as my personal experience with investment advisory from a Norwegian bank recommends
actively managed funds as a viable investment strategy. The ethical challenge in this matter is
the financial actors’ dilemma towards its customers. Every financial actor has stakeholders de-
manding growth and an increase in value. The apparent product for economic growth will be
the banks’ products through actively managed funds with the highest management fees. How-
ever, the best choice for the customers from our computations will be a passively managed fund.
The responsibility of the bank is two-fold. They must portray ethical standards towards their
customers, as well as create value for their owners. The handling of these dilemmas, I believe,
can be done through transparency. As mentioned in the introduction of the paper, luck plays a
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big part in funds return. When buying a mutual fund, you are, in essence betting on whether
that particular fund will perform in the future. The future is unknown to all. But by displaying
the actively managed funds as they are, the consumer may choose a fund based on the correct
assumptions. You may be lucky, and your actively managed fund outperforms – however, we
can not identify any persistent skill with the managers. Or, you can invest in passively managed
funds and follow the market with less risk, fewer costs, but less possibility of a luck outperfor-
mance.
Statistical research Our thesis performs several statistical procedures and combats many
possible biases which may occur in multiple testing. As researchers, we have a responsibility
of objectivity in our testing. A problem in general statistics is the human error and the inherent
subjective aspect of testing for a result you want to achieve. General knowledge states that the
first and foremost responsibility of a researcher or a scientist is to present the facts objectively
and untampered. The public view of researchers is a view of credibility. If a researcher submits
a result and can display full transparency and methodology, I tend to believe the work presented.
Through our thesis, we have encountered this problem. Through testing, the results may often
differ from your initial hopes. As a researcher, you have to accept that fact and reject the hy-
potheses if the numbers are insignificant. But it is not in the testing, the most prominent problems
occur. The sample plays an enormous role in the statistical testing. How do you create a sample,
which assumptions, when is it representative, where did the information come from, why is the
sample as it is? These questions were central when assessing the sample. As a researcher, you
may know what kind of sample will produce the best results for your personal ambition even
before creating the sample.
The responsibility of the researcher is to remain objective. There has been notable growth in
data snooping or ”p-hacking” (Chordia T., Goyal A. and Saretto A., 2017). This phenomenon is
generally explained as the chase of significance or the attempt to acquire a wanted result. Many
researchers are funded through an organization that wants to analyze a specific problem. Often
the results are expected but must be definite for an organization to proceed with its plans or ac-
tions. In such scenarios, the researcher is not entirely objective, as his salary and the project’s
income rely upon an organization for funds. There may arise serious ethical challenges in such
a scenario. However, the responsibility of the researcher is always to be objective. The solution
to such issues is always to incorporate independent researchers to ensure unbiased results. Inde-
pendency breeds objectivity. Our thesis discusses potential biases that could occur in different
assumptions upon the sample and took these into account. Further, we located the sample of
Norwegian mutual funds’ historical returns before the research question and tests were formed
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to combat research bias (Sørensen, L. Q., 2011).
By writing a thesis anchored in financial parameters, we discovered that the potential ethical
problems were less than a qualitative thesis might experience. Our data and analyses consist of
numbers, equations and mathematical programs. We believe we experienced less responsibility
for the outcome of the results and findings in the thesis due to this fact. By relying on proven
mathematical and statistical approaches, and further previous research, we were able to focus on
the execution of the analysis itself instead of the actual data mining. Of course, the responsibil-
ity is to hold true to the methods, numbers, and procedures, but if you are able to do this, the
numbers will present the plain facts untainted. Further, one problem with statistical and mathe-
matically proven procedures is that you must rely on the work performed by the ones before you.
We have experienced through our thesis’ literature review that the same tests and methods are
constantly improved, contradicted, disproven or proved by other articles and researchers. This
fact increases the responsibility for us to be critical to previous literature and their respective
findings. To combat this problem, we implemented three well-known procedures and performed
them all to present comparable results. These procedures delivered results that aligned, which
in turn increase the robustness of the thesis. The responsibility of objectivity also requires the
assessment of different approaches.
General discussion, conclusion and final remarks
In our master’s thesis, we encountered several dilemmas of ethical nature. First, we expe-
rienced that the possibility of manipulating results would be pretty easy if the original sample
were tampered with and that we could get the results we wanted. However, we discovered that
the numbers and facts eventually would provide the correct picture, no matter what our priors
were on the subject. Second, through the choice of sample, we encountered a lack of criticism on
our part. We re-used a sample from a previous paper, which in turn was located from a reliable
source. However, initially, we did not double-check the initial source of the data. As a researcher,
we are responsible for the data used in our analyses. Eventually, the data background was verified
and compared to the original data available from the provider to ensure its correctness.
In conclusion, our master’s thesis fronts several dilemmas surrounding the term responsibil-
ity. We discover that active fund management underperforms in most cases through our analysis
of active mutual fund management and its inherent results. When outperformance is present, it is
the result of luck. The market characteristics do not represent these findings as there is a growth
in the investment in actively managed mutual funds. This points to the question of the informa-
tion flow and transparency in the actors in the financial markets and whether they perform their
responsibility as objective and independent advisors to their customers, providing all available
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information for decision-making. Further, the responsibility of scientists is increasingly debated,
as there has been an increase in data spooning and p-hacking over the years. The responsibility
lies with the researchers as they are expected to perform objectively and independently in their
research. However, the bias of funding in research increases the ethical dilemma of researchers.
If the results align with their expected results, funding is increased; if not, funding decreases. Ul-
timately, our thesis projects the dilemma of responsibility through both the topic of our analysis
and the methods conducted. We have experienced the necessity of responsible decision-making
in our work, as we have strived to be as objective and independent we can, even though our
work depends heavily on previous work and procedures. We have tried to manage these dilem-
mas, projecting responsibility by incorporating several approaches towards the same sample and
acquired the sample and the dataset as a whole from a source independent of our thesis.
I believe we have presented responsibility towards the analyses through our actions, as pre-
viously stated. We have shed light upon several themes where a lack of responsibility may exist.
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Appendix H: Discussion paper - André Jørgensen
Master’s thesis 2021 - Discussion paper on the topic of Responsibility
This discussion paper is written in the context of the Master Thesis in a master’s degree in
business administration at The University of Agder. The reflection first presents a summary of
the thesis, “A performance evaluation of Norwegian mutual funds: Luck versus Skill,” second,
we reflect on the given subject “responsibilities” in our thesis and other important aspects to the
subject.
Summary of the Master Thesis
Our thesis concerns the question of whether Norwegian mutual fund managers can outper-
form their benchmark index. The managers need special skills to be outperforming beyond their
cost of management. We also want to assess whether there is a lack of skill among Norwegian
mutual fund managers. The dataset we use consists of 107 Norwegian mutual funds and their
monthly returns from 1987 to 2019.
We use a pricing model with multiple factors to separate the actual performance of the man-
agers given by an alpha (α). The results illustrate that several managers can generate positive
alphas. However, we further test if this results from luck or skills because, in a large dataset,
some managers will outperform or underperform by coincidence. We test this by similar ap-
proaches to the bootstrap methodology of Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and White (2006)
and Fama & French (2010). Finally, we set the alpha to zero to operate under the null hypothesis
of zero performance and calculate the p-value to check if the bootstrapped iteration generates
more extreme positive values than our actual values.
The novelty of our thesis is the consideration of Type II errors and contribution by more ro-
bust conclusions than previous findings to the subject. We conduct the methodology by Harvey
& Liu (2020) to test the null hypotheses that a fraction p0 is outperforming or underperforming.
In our conclusion, we cannot find outperforming managers in the Norwegian mutual fund mar-
ket; however, the test power is much below the recommended level, implying that there might be
outperforming managers, but our test is not powerful enough to detect them. We do, however,
find statistically significant evidence that skill is absent among the worst-performing Norwegian
mutual fund managers.
General Discussion
The subject of responsibility is of high importance to the field of performance evaluation
within finance. In this reflection note, we evaluate the importance of responsibility towards
the research process and the responsibility of the mutual fund managers. We first assess the
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importance of potential biases in the dataset we use. Further, we evaluate the robustness of
common approaches used. We also discuss an important issue within hypothesis testing called
“p-hacking.” Finally, another topic relevant to our thesis is responsibility regarding mutual fund
managers.
The first topic of responsibility I will discuss is the potential biases in the dataset we use. This
topic concerns the probability that the dataset is not representative of the case we want to inves-
tigate. First, we will present an example of our thesis’s topic if we set a minimum requirement
of observations like the previous methodology by Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and White
(2006), where the minimum is 36 observations in the dataset. This high requirement results in
survivorship bias because, as we demonstrate in the thesis, the “alive” funds exhibit a higher
return than the “dead” funds. Thus, we have a responsibility to include a representative dataset
in the thesis, but it will not represent the actual case if we exclude all the bad performances.
The exclusion of noisy time periods also vexes empirical results. However, do this indicate
that we should exclude a time period because it ruins our results? Harvey (2020) illustrated this
issue in the YouTube clip “Tortured Data” with an example of the Norwegian Oil Fund. The
main result was that “Abstracting from the financial crisis, we conclude that active management
of both equity and fixed income has significantly contributed to the return of funds.” Then Harvey
raised whether they could justify excluding one of the most important financial events in modern
time when evaluating financial performance. Another issue relevant to our thesis is the possibility
of increasing the “test power” to accomplish the desired result. One possible variable we could
change to increase the test power is by increasing the significance level that sets the Type I
error. The approach of Harvey & Liu (2020) specify the importance of first setting the desired
significance level to the Type I error to estimate further the Type II error (test power = 1-Type
II).
There is a responsibility towards the researcher to correct the potential biases associated with
multiple testing. For example, we use several tests in our thesis to determine whether there exist
outperforming managers. According to Fama & French (2010), the methodology by Kosowski
et al. (2006) did not account for potential correlation in the performance that the factor model
could not capture. Further, they also suggested that the minimum required observation should be
lower to account for potential survivorship bias in the sample. Eventually, Harvey & Liu (2020)
implied that the tests by Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama & French (2010) were not powerful
to identify any possible outperforming managers. Then they suggested a methodology that tests
the null hypothesis that a fraction of managers outperforms the benchmark. The availability of
big data and advancing technology for computing make the importance of correct use of multiple
testing a vital responsibility to use the correct testing procedure when evaluating performance.
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The subject of “p-hacking” relates well to issues towards responsibilities within research
approaches. “p-hacking” concerns using statistical methods to obtain a desired significant result.
There are several ways to guide the research process to achieve a wanted result, and we will
present the issues with some of these approaches. For example, suppose a researcher makes
several statistical approaches but only reports a single “outstanding significant” result. Then, the
researcher could convince that the significant result was the only result the researcher initially
examined. This result would be p-hacking because the researcher does not report the other results
like he initially tested to get the desired result.
Another phenomenon towards “p-hacking” was presented previously in the reflection note
on the Norwegian Oil Fund, excluding important data that change the result. This exclusion of
data that leads to another conclusion than if the important data was not excluded is an important
part of the research process. Suppose managers want to assess their own performance and start
to exclude important data to improve their own results. None of these papers would be relevant
for investors to use.
There are several ways to do “p-hacking” if the researchers use any attempts to manipulate
or exclude a part of the sample to achieve the most significant result. Another responsibility of
concern is when researchers delegate research to an assistant. The assistant could manipulate the
data to achieve a result that would please the researcher. A relationship like this could lead the
assistant to p-hacking, such that the researcher would be pleased.
The primary historical responsibility for fund managers has been to generate profits for their
investors. However, an increasing focus on responsibility has altered how fund managers lay
their premises for the funds. There are several opportunities in the mutual fund market on funds
that have clear rules towards social- and environmental responsibilities. For example, there ex-
ist funds in the Norwegian mutual fund market that only invest in climate-friendly companies
or renewable energy. The demand has increased dramatically, and the fund managers have ac-
commodated their requests by creating several opportunities for mutual funds. There are several
ethical responsibilities towards investments in stocks that we will present below. First, the re-
sponsibility of children’s rights is about not investing in the companies that contribute to child
labor. The responsibility towards corruption, the importance of reasonable procedures to avoid
potential corruption in the companies. The responsibility for human rights is an essential aspect
of investing in a company. All the mentioned strategies of responsibilities are of high importance
to avoid contribution to these social problems. When assessing a potential investment, other vital
aspects of responsibility are the importance of a responsible business model towards taxes and
correct accounting practice.
Environmental and responsible funds have the abbreviation ESG “ Environmental, Social and
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Governance.” The investor needs to consider all these factors as well as the financial performance
when they evaluate stocks. Nevertheless, ESG stocks do not have a clear guideline towards
whether they can be named ESG stocks or not, and this makes the job harder for the investor.
However, the EU wants to prepare a standard marking for these funds, EU Ecolabel. The focus
on ESG stocks has increased in recent years. There seems to be a high expectation towards these
stocks to do well in the future. This also leads to the problem of high valued stocks only because
of their future expectations. An ESG stock could, in principle, not generate profits but still be
valued extremely expensive due to their expectations.
The Norwegian Oil fund “Statens Pensjonfond Utland,” which have the majority of their in-
vestment in stocks, follow strict regulations as they invest the pension of the Norwegian people.
In addition, they have a council on ethics that considers the responsibility of the fund‘s invest-
ments.
Conclusion
The result of the reflection note is that both researchers and investors have an essential re-
sponsibility towards investments and their evaluation. The researcher is responsible for avoiding
“p-hacking” to present reliable research results, as we illustrate by numerous examples. Further
from the investor’s perspective, the investor has a responsibility towards several environmental,
social and governmental aspects.
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